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ABSTRACT 
 
 
THE BIRTH OF ANTI-SOVIET IMAGE IN THE TURKISH PRESS 
FOLLOWING THE SECOND WORLD WAR AND ITS REFLECTIONS 
AFTER THE DEATH OF STALIN (1953 – 1964)  
 
Çağdaş, Nâzım Arda 
M.A., Department of International Relations 
Supervisor: Associate Prof. S. Hakan Kırımlı 
September 2008 
 
 
This study aims to analyze the construction of the anti-Soviet sentiment in 
the Turkish press at the beginning of the Cold War, and its evolution during the 
period from the death of Stalin in 1953 until the ouster of Khrushchev in 1964. 
After an assessment of the antagonism towards Russia in the Turkish public 
before 1945, the immense rise of anti-Sovietism in the Turkish press during the 
Straits of the Crisis between the Soviet Union and Turkey will be analyzed. The 
long term influence of anti-Soviet stance during the crisis, which was also 
reflected to the quarrel between Tan and Tanin newspapers in 1945, over the 
period 1953–1964 will be examined. Three main issues will be analyzed: The 
 iv
influence of the Turkish governments over the press in terms of the construction 
of a negative Soviet image will be questioned. The anti-Soviet stance among the 
Turkish journalists apart from the state influence will be assessed. The reasons for 
the relaxation of anti-Sovietism up to 1960s will be analyzed. In this context, the 
general tendency of the Turkish press will be examined with regard to the 
examples from the anti-Soviet content from eight prominent newspapers of that 
period. Primarily Ulus, as the official press organ of the Republican People’s 
Party; and Zafer, as the semi-official press organ of the Democratic Party; and six 
independent newspapers, Akşam, Cumhuriyet, Dünya, Hürriyet, Milliyet, and 
Vatan will be surveyed in terms of their anti-Soviet content. The prominent 
journalists in these newspapers will be also emphasized to observe the individual 
anti-Soviet perspectives in the press. The changing attitudes in the press will be 
assessed with regard to the developments in the Cold War.  
Key words: Turkish press, anti-communism, anti-Russianism, Turco-
Russian relations, Cold War. 
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ÖZET 
 
 
TÜRK BASININDA İKİNCİ DÜNYA SONRASINDA ANTİ-SOVYET 
GÖRÜŞÜN DOĞMASI VE BUNUN STALİN’İN ÖLÜMÜNDEN SONRAKİ 
DÖNEME ETKİLERİ (1953 – 1964)  
 
Çağdaş, Nâzım Arda 
Master Tezi, Uluslararası İlişkiler Bölümü 
Tez Yöneticisi: Doç. Dr. S. Hakan Kırımlı 
September 2008 
 
Bu çalışma, Soğuk Savaş’ın başlangıcında Türk basını tarafından yaratılan 
Sovyet karşıtı hissiyatı ve bunun Stalin’in 1953 yılındaki ölümünden, Hruşçov’un 
1964 yılında devrilmesine kadar olan dönemdeki evrimini incelemeyi 
amaçlamaktadır. Türk kamuoyunda Rusya’ya karşı 1945’ten önceki düşmanlığın 
değerlendirilmesinin ardından, Türk basınında Sovyetler Birliği ve Türkiye 
arasında Boğazlar Krizi sırasında büyük bir yükselişe geçen Sovyet aleyhtarlığına 
değinilecektir. 1945’te Tan ve Tanin gazeteleri arasındaki kavgaya yansıyan bu 
Sovyet karşıtı tutumun, 1953–1964 yılları arasındaki döneme uzun vadedeki 
etkileri incelenecektir. Üç ana konu irdelenecektir: Türk hükümetlerinin, olumsuz 
bir Sovyet imajı inşa etmek anlamında Türk basınındaki etkisi sorgulanacak, Türk 
 vi
gazetecileri arasında devletin etkisinin dışındaki Sovyet aleyhtarlığı 
değerlendirilecek ve bu karşıtlığın 1960’lara doğru zayıflamasının sebepleri 
irdelenecektir. Bu bağlamda, basındaki genel eğilim dönemin önde gelen sekiz 
Türk gazetesinden Sovyet karşıtı içerikle ilişkili olarak gözden geçirilecektir: 
Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi’nin resmî basın organı Ulus; Demokrat Parti’nin yarı 
resmî basın organı Zafer; ve altı bağımsız gazete, Akşam, Cumhuriyet, Dünya, 
Hürriyet, Milliyet, ve Vatan Sovyet aleyhtarı içerikleri bakımından incelenecektir. 
Türk basınında bireysel Sovyet karşıtı perspektifleri gözlemlemek için, bu 
gazetelerin önde gelen yazarları da mercek altına alınacaktır. Basında değişen 
tutumlar Soğuk Savaş’ın gelişmeleriyle ilişkili olarak değerlendirilecektir.  
Anahtar Kelimeler: Türk basını, Sovyet karşıtlığı, komünizm karşıtlığı, 
Türk-Rus ilişkileri, Soğuk Savaş. 
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CHAPTER I 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
Turco-Russian relations are mostly evaluated in terms of rivalry since the 
beginning. Hostility between the expanding Russian Empire and declining 
Ottoman Empire reached its climax during the 19th century. The emergence of 
this process can be directly related with the wide territorial expansion of the 
Imperial Russia, including Ottoman lands. Following the annexation of the 
Crimean Khanate in 1783, Russia became the first Christian state, which 
permanently annexed an Ottoman territory with a majority of Muslim inhabitants 
whose loss the Ottoman Empire could never reconcile itself. With the rare 
exceptions of temporary Russian aid to the Ottomans once against Napoléon1 in 
                                               
1
 During Napoleonic Wars a major war broke out also between Russia and Ottoman Empire (1806 
– 1812). Here, the aid refers to the alliance in the Second Coalition (1799 – 1802), in which Great 
Britain, Russia, and the Ottoman Empire were in the same front. Russia did not send aid directly to 
the Ottoman Empire in its struggle against French in Egypt but the joint campaign of the Coalition 
forces to French Alps forced Napoléon to withdraw from the Ottoman lands. For detailed 
information, see Aryeh Shmuelevitz, ed., Napoleon and the French in Egypt and the Holy Land: 
Articles Presented at the 2nd International Congress of Napoleonic Studies Israel, July 4-11, 1999 
(İstanbul: Isis Press, 2002); Timothy C.W. Blanning, The Origins of the French Revolutionary 
Wars (London; New York: Longman, 1986).  
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the first decade of 19th century and later against Kavalalı Mehmed Ali Pasha (or 
Muhammed Ali)2 of Egypt in 1833, Russia was often considered as the 
‘protagonist’ among the rivals of the Sublime Porte until 1917. Thus, a solid anti-
Russian sentiment became apparent especially among the Muslim subjects of the 
Ottoman Empire, which was very deeply rooted due to several wars fought 
against Russians. 
The international conjuncture in the aftermath of the First World War 
triggered an instrumental alliance between newly born Bolshevik government of 
Vladimir Ilyich Lenin and the revolutionary government of Mustafa Kemal Pasha, 
both of which attributed them an anti-imperialist character. In contrast to prior 
alliances between Russians and Turks, this partnership remarked the first (and still 
the last) ideological rapprochement between the parties. Both regimes were 
planning to reconstruct their societies with a new set of values over the ashes of 
their predecessors. In both regimes, it meant the abolishment of all ‘obsolete’ 
values and their replacement with ‘new - modern’ values. As a matter of fact, the 
ideological character of the Soviet Union was always the prime aspect of its polity 
until 1991. On the other side, foreign policy of the Turkish Republic was also 
based on the mixture of some traditional values and Kemalist principles after the 
declaration of the republic.3 Construction of new values in all areas of life 
(certainly including political perceptions) could be a proper chance to forget past 
                                               
2
 As a necessity of anti-nationalist (or anti-rebellious) policies of Nikolay I, a Russian fleet arrived 
to Constantinople in order to balance Egyptian forces and their supporters, Great Britain and 
France. For detailed information about the relations between the Mohammed Ali’s uprising and 
the rise of the Eastern Question, see Mohammed Sabry, L'empire Egyptien Sous Mohamed-Ali et 
la Question d'Orient (1811-1849) (Paris: Librairie orientaliste, P. Geuthner, 1930). For Russian 
view about the Egyptian Question, see: Rene Cattaui, Le Regne de Mohamed Aly d'Apres les 
Archives Russes en Egypte (Cairo: Pour La Societe Royale De Geographie D'Egypte, 1931).   
3
 The influence of the “Ottoman Legacy” is a widely accepted phenomenon within the republican 
policies. Turkish foreign policy is defined as a combination of Ottoman experiences and vision of 
the new regime. For a brief assessment, see: William Hale, Turkish Foreign Policy 1774-2000 
(London: Frank Cass, 2001), pp.38-39. 
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transgressions and former animosity, as new political doctrines of Turks and 
Russians had some common points, such as anti-imperialism. 
The short term alliance and following period of amity from 1923 to 1939 
could resemble like the opening of a clean sheet between the successors of two 
rival empires. However, the economic contribution of the Soviet Union to the 
development of Turkey would remain insufficient to eliminate the mistrust among 
Turks about Russia. Moreover, the Turkish state consequently gained an official 
anti-communist identity during the first decade of the Cold War. The notable 
point of the transformation in Turkish foreign policy was the sudden change (or 
reinstitution of Russian fear) in Turkish public stance towards Russia. In other 
words, the same Kemalist government had a liability to direct the press to praise 
Turkey’s friendship with the ‘peace loving’ Soviet Union during 1930s and then 
to renounce any kind of rapprochement between them and their ‘aggressive’ 
northern neighbor after 1945. Turkey had concrete reasons to follow a careful 
path against the Soviet Union, such as the changing conjuncture of the 
international system and the instable attitude of Stalin towards Turkey.4 However, 
the shift was quite drastic and perhaps the unique example in the history of 
Turkish foreign policy, as it even did not influence the severe competition 
between Republican People’s Party (RPP) and Democratic Party (DP). Neither the 
transfer of the authority between Turkish parties nor Stalin’s death resulted with a 
                                               
4
 Stalin’s change towards Turkey can be obviously related with the consolidation of his power after 
the Great Purge. However, Stalin’s inconsistency was not new for the Soviet Union in 1938. Some 
of Stalin’s decisions were extraordinarily drastic. Even his decision for the signing of Molotov– 
Ribbentrop Pact was not the outcome of a well-planned strategy but a quick shift in his perceptions. 
Alliance with Germans would constitute a natural shift against Turkey. It is mostly claimed that 
self-assertive Stalin often ignored experienced Soviet statesmen such as Maxim Litvinov, who had 
proposed the containment of Germany. Although the existence of Stalin’s early tendencies to 
approach Germans, it seems invalid according to Soviet archive documents. One important claim 
belongs to Jonathan Haslam, who opposes Robert C. Tucker’s theory about the early tendencies of 
Stalin. See Jonathan Haslam, “The Making of Foreign Policy under Stalin” in Teriyuki Hara and 
Kimitaka Matsuzato, eds., Empire and Society (Sapporo: Hokkaido University Slavic Research 
Center: 1997). 
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détente between the governments. Instead, anti-communist sentiment, which 
became synonymous with anti-Russianism, was a very popular theme in both pro-
RPP and pro-DP press, as the only common aspect of these parties was foreign 
policy.  
This study aims to question the influence of the Turkish state over the 
press from Stalin’s death (1953) to 1964, uncoincidentally the same year of 
sudden deterioration in Turco-American relations with Johnson’s letter and 
Khruschev’s ouster from Soviet leadership. Did prominent journalists in Turkish 
newspapers foment anti-communism in 1950s independently or did they serve 
governmental circles, who strove to achieve at least some semblance of the public 
consent in their anti-Soviet foreign policy? The Soviet efforts for rapprochement 
after Stalin’s death remained insufficient until 1960s and the new crises emerged 
between Turkey and the Soviet Union. As the press was the most effective tool of 
the Turkish state for propaganda, the evolution of the Soviet image in the Turkish 
press was essential to recognize whether the Turkish leaders between 1945 and 
1960 (until the coup d’etat on May 27, 1960) aimed to construct a hostile Soviet 
image in the society to improve the public support behind them. Instead, were the 
journalists of 1950s and 1960s freer from state manipulation than they were 
supposed?  
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CHAPTER II 
 
 
FROM THE TEMPORARY AMITY TO THE 
PERMANENT ENMITY: RUSSIAN IMAGE IN 
TURKEY UNTIL THE SECOND WORLD WAR 
 
 
 
2.1 Mutual Hostile Images between Turks and Russians 
 
The prevalent anti-Russian sentiment among Turks until the collapse of the 
Tsarist regime was probably the primary factor for the birth of suspicions for the 
communist Soviet regime among the Turkish public and governmental circles. 
Unlike the anti-Russianism in 1940s and 1950s, which was suddenly fomented by 
particular people, the negative Russian image in Turkey until 1920s emerged as a 
natural consequence of the frequent wars lasted three centuries between the 
Ottoman Empire and Russian Empire.  
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2.1.1 Anti-Muslim Sentiment in Russia until 1917  
 
It is possible to claim that the immemorial anti-Muslim sentiment in the 
Russian society was the main ferment of Turco-Russian antagonism. The roots of 
this negative image go back to the archaic anti-Tatar sentiment in Russia, which 
had been the consequence of the long-term rule of the Golden Horde over the 
medieval Russian principalities. Following the terrifying rule of Tatars lasted 
nearly three centuries from 1223 (Battle of Kalka) to 1480 (the Standoff on the 
Ugra), Russians gradually levied heavy burdens on Tatars and banned them from 
a variety of rights after their reconquista beginning from Kazan (1552). Following 
the conquest, unconverted Tatars around Kazan were expelled from their ancient 
capital.5 However, Russians continued to struggle with Tatars until the fall of the 
Crimean Khanate. Therefore, anti-Muslim sentiment of Russians had been already 
settled, when they faced with Ottomans first time.  
The second essential component of Russian’s antipathy for Turkish was 
the conquest of Constantinople by Ottomans, which caused a long-lasted trauma 
for the entire Orthodox world. In the midst of the 16th century, the Ottoman 
Sultans established their authority over all Orthodox lands up to Southern Bug 
River,6 while Russia remained as the sole independent orthodox Christian country. 
After the loss of Constantinople, from the 16th century on Russia began to style 
Moscow as the ‘Third Rome’, after the fall of the ‘second’ Rome to infidels, while 
                                               
5
 Azade-Ayşe Rorlich, Idel Tatarları: Milli Çıdamlığına Tarihi Karaş [The Volga Tatars – A 
Profile in National Resilience] (Moscow: Insan Publishing House, 2000), pp. 37–48. 
6
 The raids of Crimean Tatars to Ukrainian lands promoted Ottoman control up to this region. 
Ottomans assumed the control of the northern regions of the modern Ukraine in different interims 
according to their periodic alliances with Zaporozhian Cossacks. A notable one was Doroshenko’s 
oath of allegiance and acception of the Ottoman suzerainty. See Philip Longworth, The Cossacks 
(London: Constable, 1969), pp.156-157. The last alliance between Ottomans and Zaporozhian 
Cossacks was formed in the eve of unsuccessful Pruth Campaign of Pyotr Velikiy (1711) and 
Cossack Hetmans Ivan Mazeppa and Pylyp Orlyk fought alongside the Turks last time. For 
detailed information, see Longworth, pp.167–168. 
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the first had been already under the control of the ‘Catholic heretics’. This claim 
was also legitimized after the marriage of Russian grand prince Ivan III, with 
Sophia (or Zoë) Paleologos, the niece of the last Byzantine emperor, Constantine 
IX Paleologos.7 These long-term claims constituted a solid base for future 
aspirations of some Russian Pan-Slavists to create a Pan-Slavic empire ruled from 
Constantinople.8 These age-old aspirations also seemed relevant with Stalin’s 
foreign policy in the Straits Crisis of 1945, as Soviet Union tried to legitimize the 
invasions of Finland and Baltic Republics in 1940 with prior Russian control over 
these areas. 
Anti-Muslim sentiment also gained a cultural aspect in the 19th century, 
with the debates about the ‘real’ historical place of Russia in world history and the 
question “where Russia belongs to.” Thus, tatarskoe igo (Tatar Yoke) became a 
rudimental element of the philosophical paradigm of especially Zapadnik9 faction 
in the Russian Intelligentsia, notably after Pyotr Iakovlevich Chaadaev, and later 
Aleksandr Ivanovich Herzen. Chaadaev claimed that Russia was about to reach 
the peak in its era of enlightenment just before the Mongol conquest. On the 
matter of the severity of Mongol devastation, he even agreed with his arch rival, 
prominent Slavophile, Aleksey Stepanovich Khomiakov (1804-1860).10 After 
Chaadaev, Herzen’s account also seems like a justification for Russian isolation 
                                               
7
 Mentioned legitimacy is still debated by many historians and theologians. As an example, see 
John Meyendorff, “Was There Ever a “Third Rome”? Remarks on the Byzantine Legacy in 
Russia” in Rome, Constantinople, Moscow: Historical and Theological Studies (New York: St 
Vladimir’s Seminary Press: 1953).    
8
 Constantinople centered Pan-Slavic Empire project did not belong to entire Pan-Slavist circles, 
but was first mentioned in individual works of Nikolay Ia. Danilevsky and Rostislav A. Fadieev. 
For detailed information, see Michael Boro Petrovich, The Emergence of Russian Pan-Slavism 
1856-1870 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1958), pp. 269–271. 
9
 Westernist 
10
 Raymond T. McNally, “Chaadaev Versus Xomjakov in the Late 1830’s and 1840’s” Journal of 
the History of the Ideas, Vol. 27, No. 1, (Jan.-Mar. 1966), pp.84–86. 
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from Europe.11 The ‘Tatar Yoke’ was not grown as a state sponsored idea among 
the progressive circles in Russia, but as a natural consequence of a historical and 
societal legacy.  
The Russian state did not officially support an ideology, promoting the 
theory of the Tatar Yoke, but they also did not act as lenient patrons over their 
Muslim subjects, whose number would reach 18 millions just before the First 
World War.12 Tatars, who were previously subjected to forced conversions in 
medieval times, then faced the cultural assimilation projects such as the orthodox 
mission of Nikolay Ivanovich Ilminsky. 
Anti-Muslim sentiment was turned against the Ottoman Empire, when the 
Russian Pan-Slavism emerged as a political doctrine, aiming the emancipation of 
Central European and Balkan Slavs from the rule of Habsburgs and Ottomans. 
Russian state always aimed at checking the development of nationalism under its 
own control, defining their official ideology during 1840’s associated with the 
name of Sergey Semionovich Uvarov, minister of public education from 1833 to 
1849.13 The Russian Pan-Slavist movement had firstly emphasized on the cultural 
rights of Central European Slavs. During this period, the leading Pan-Slavist 
intellectuals in press, especially Ivan Sergeyevich Aksakov openly declared 
Austria as the primary enemy for Pan-Slavism, due to its cultural hegemony over 
Central European Slavs and its ambitions over Balkan Slavs.14 However, the fury 
of Pan-Slavism turned to the Ottoman Empire after the revolts in Herzegovina and 
Bulgaria, which triggered the outbreak of Russo-Turkish War of 1877-1878. 
                                               
11
 For Herzen’s ideas, see Alexandre Herzen, La Russie et l’Occident, trans. André Prudhomme 
(Paris: Editions des Portes de France, 1946), pp.33–54. 
12
 Aleksandre Bennigsen, Islam in Soviet Union: General Presentation (London: Pall Mall, 1967), 
p.3. 
13
 For detailed information, see Nicholas V. Riazanovsky, Nicholas I and Official Nationality in 
Russia 1825 – 1855 (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1969), pp. 52–72 
14
 Petrovich, pp. 244–245. 
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During this war, the ideas of the Pan-Slavist intellectuals were beneficial for the 
Russian state. On the other hand, this did not mean the termination of 
governmental inspections over Slavic Benevolent Committees, main civil 
organizations of Russian Pan-Slavists.15 The end of the Russo-Turkish War 1877-
1878 also refers to a great demise in state’s favor for Pan-Slavism. Although the 
Pan-Slavist bureaucrats, scholars and journalists pursued their anti-Austrian ideas 
even to the degree of forcing the Russian state to challenge Austria in 1908 after 
Bosnian Crisis,16 they did not undertake a major anti-Muslim or anti-Turkish role 
after 1878. In contrast, anti-Westernism was about to become a common point 
between the Russian and Turkish intellectuals. For instance, in 1908, the Russian 
newspaper Novoe Vremia drew attention to common anti-Western doubts of 
Turkey and Russia on the eve of the Bosnian Crisis, in reference to similarities 
between Russian and Turkish societies.17  
The anti-Turkish sentiment in Russia was the direct outcome of the anti-
Muslim feelings among Russians, which had mostly been associated with the 
Russian’s antipathy towards the Tatars and other Muslim subjects in their borders. 
Although the plans of Russian expansion aimed the Ottoman lands to a very large 
extent, including particularly Constantinople, anti-Ottomanism was not the sole 
sentiment, which directed Russian foreign policy during the Tsarist regime. 
  
                                               
15
 Petrovich, pp.241-243. 
16
 Sidney Bradshaw Fay, The Origins of the World War (New York: Macmillan Company, 1935), 
pp.378–385. 
17
 Ulaş Mangıtlı, "Turkish-Russian Relations and the Evolution of Identities, Images and 
Perceptions" Paper presented at the annual meeting of the International Studies Association, 
Hilton Hawaiian Village,Honolulu on 5 March 2005,http://www.allacademic.com/meta 
/p69504_index.html (accessed June 28, 2008), p.12. 
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2.1.2. General Russian Image among Ottomans until 1920s:  
 
In contrast to the republican period of Turkey, the negative Russian image 
emerged as a gradual and natural phenomenon in the Ottoman Empire. The rise of 
this negative sentiment among Turks was related directly with several wars with 
Russia, and indirectly with the memories of the emigrants fled from the Russian 
oppression both in war times and peace times, including intellectuals. Hundreds of 
families from every province of the Empire could have the pain of losing a family 
member in a war against Russia, but anti-Russianism was stronger especially 
among the inhabitants of the Danubian principalities, Rumelia and Eastern 
Anatolia, who directly faced with the invasion of Russian armies. Therefore, the 
negative image of the ‘Russian’ often had a distinguished place among the other 
xenophobic images among Ottoman Muslims. Beyond other traditional words, 
used for common usage such as Frenk (a common word used for any kind of 
European, despite its obvious origin from ‘French or Frank’) or küffar (infidels), 
the word Moskof (Muscovite) gradually gained a derogative meaning among 
people. The reflections of anti-Russianism have been obvious even in folkloric 
elements. 
As a secondary factor, the negative experiences and memories about the 
‘evil’ treatment by the Russians came to the Ottoman lands, along with great 
numbers of emigrants first from Crimea and Caucasia, later from the newly lost 
Balkan provinces. This negative stance not only contributed greatly to anti-
Russian sentiment of formerly invaded provinces, but also spread to the central 
Anatolian provinces, which had never seen Russian armies directly. 
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The reflections of popularly growing sentiment against Russians could 
also be partially seen among the enlightened circles of the Ottoman Empire, 
although the antipathy was not as deep as the popular hatred for Russians. Given 
the aggressive Russian stance towards the Ottoman Empire throughout most of 
the 19th century, it was almost impossible to observe a pro-Russian group in 
Ottoman intellectual circles. Long periods of tension in 19th century, including 
two major wars with Russia and intensive Russian support for the nationalist 
uprisings in the Balkans, prevented the emergence of pro-Russian parties inside 
the Ottoman bureaucracy. The common characteristic of pro-British, pro-French, 
and later pro-German factions in the bureaucracy was their fear for Russia, while 
each of them proposed alliance with different great powers against the Tsar. As an 
exception, Mahmud Nedim Pasha, grand vizier of Sultan Abdülaziz in two terms 
from 1871 to 1872 and from 1875 to 1876 could be considered as pro-Russian. 
The reason behind his strong tendency was probably his allegiance to the Russian 
Ambassador to the Porte, Nikolay Pavlovich Ignatiev, or his opposition to the 
Young Turks, most of which were generally perceived as pro-British or pro-
French. Nedim Pasha’s sympathy for an alliance with Russia made him quite 
unpopular and even led to nicknaming him Nedimoff. 18 
After two great wars with Russia, Ottoman statesmen and intellectuals 
began to publish first accounts, reflecting their anti-Russianism. However, these 
accounts did not always Russian state itself but blamed particular figures for the 
deterioration of Turco-Russian relations. For instance, the accounts of Gazi 
Ahmed Muhtar Pasha,19 a prominent Turkish general in Russo-Turkish War of 
                                               
18
 İbnülemin Mahmut Kemal İnal, Osmanlı Devrinde Son Sadrıazamlar, (İstanbul: Maarif 
Matbaası, 1940), Cüz 1, p.309. 
19
 Ahmed Muhtar, Sergüzeşt-i Hayatım’ın Cild-i Evveli, prep. Nuri Akbayar et al. (İstanbul: Tarih 
Vakfı Yurt Yayınları, 1996), pp. 104–05, 109. 
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1877-1878, and Abdurrahman Şeref,20 the last official chronicler of the Sultanate, 
depicted Ignatiev as an ‘evil’ man who had personally incited the revolts in the 
Balkans.  
Despite the fact that the Ottoman intellectuals did not have connections 
with St. Petersburg like the strong ties established especially by the Young Turk 
exiles in France, Switzerland, and Great Britain, Ottoman press was never 
remained ignorant over the developments in Russia. Ottoman newspaper Tasvir-i 
Efkâr informed its readers about the daily progress of the Polish Rebellion of 
1863 in February.21 Old friendship with Poles against Russia (as the common foe), 
had already created sympathy in the Ottoman public opinion towards the ethnic 
groups suppressed by Russians, perhaps due to the fear of sharing the same fate. 
Constantinople became an important center for nationalist refugees fleeing from 
the Tsarist persecution. Polish nationalists, notably Adam Mickiewicz and 
Hungarian nationalist refugees of 1848 led by Lajos Kossuth briefly stayed in the 
Ottoman Empire. Some of refugees (mainly Poles) permanently settled in 
Constantinople, while some were even converted to Islam such as Mustafa 
Celâleddin Pasha,22 who was murdered coincidentally during the suppression of 
Herzegovinian Uprising of 1876, supported by the Russian Pan-Slavists. It is quite 
possible that already existent Russian image was complemented by those figures. 
Nevertheless, their influence seemed limited, as they were ineffective to convince 
the government for a war against Russia. 
 
                                               
20
 Abdurrahman Şeref, Musahabe-i Tarihiye, prep. Mübeccel Nami Duru (İstanbul: Sucuoğlu 
Matbaası, 1980), pp. 179. 
21
 Tasvir-i Efkâr, issues: 66 (14 February 1863), 67 (18 February 1863), 68 (21 February 1863). 
22
 born as Konstanty Borżęcki, grandfather of Nâzım Hikmet Ran, and owner of a disputable 
theory in Turkish nationalist project, stating the ethnic kinship of Turks with Indo-European race. 
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Turkic émigré intellectuals from the Tsarist Empire also contributed the 
Russian image among the enlightened circles. Languished (but never disappeared) 
cultural ties between Ottomans and Muslims of the Russian Empire were strongly 
improved after the emergence of cultural nationalists, such as Azerbaijani poet 
and linguist Mirza Feth Ali Ahundzade (or Ahundov) and especially the Crimean 
Tatar journalist and enlightener İsmail Gasprinsky (or Gaspıralı) with his 
newspaper Tercüman, simultaneously with the improvements in Ottoman 
intellectual life under European influence. Especially after the rise of Usûl-ü 
Cedid, the enlightenment movement of Russian Muslims, many notable 
intellectuals arrived to Constantinople. Particularly after October Revolution, 
many cedid had to flee Turkey in order to escape from the Bolshevik persecution, 
including Yusuf Akçura, Ahmet Agayev,23 Sadri Maksudî Arsal,24 Mehmet Emin 
Resulzâde, Zeki Velidî Togan,25 Akdes Nimet Kurat.26 Apart from having a 
comprehensive knowledge of the Russian language and culture, they were also 
very much concerned about their Turkic kins in the Tsarist Empire. As such, they 
were sui generis figures in the Turkish press and academic environment, and they 
had essential contributions to new culture of the Republican Turkey, especially in 
the construction of modern Turkish nationalism. Although the cedids were 
incredulous to think about friendly relations with Russia, this did not mean that 
they had denied Russian influence in their ideas. The cultural aspects in the Pan-
Turkist paradigm have similarities with the Pan-Slavism. 
  
                                               
23
 later adopted the surname ‘Ağaoğlu’ 
24
 born as Sadri Nizameddinovich Maksudov 
25
 born as Ahmet Zeki Velidov  
26
 born as Akdes Nimetov 
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2.2. Smoldered Animosity until Atatürk’s Death: 
 
It is generally claimed that the Soviet aid to the Turkish nationalist 
revolutionaries during the Turkish War of Independence opened a new period for 
the perceptions of Turks about their aggressive northern neighbor. After their 
functional partnership, Bolsheviks and Kemalists initially seemed to smolder the 
prevalent animosity between Turks and Russians, whereas the former hostilities 
would be revealed after the Second World War. However, the Kemalist leadership 
did not seem to have much intimacy towards the Soviet Union, as the government 
had rigid measures to prevent communist propaganda from any origin in Anatolia. 
 
 
2.2.1 Kemalist-Bolshevik Alliance (1920–1923) as a Turning Point: 
 
Political perspectives of different Turkish writers have dominated the 
discourse in the historical debates about ‘the Soviet aid to Kemalists’ for a long 
time, while it is still difficult to present a clear definition neither for the real 
intentions of Bolsheviks nor for the real perspective of Mustafa Kemal. However, 
both the pro-Soviet and the anti-Soviet historians in Turkey agree on the realist 
characteristics of Kemalist-Bolshevik rapprochement, instead of questioning the 
existence of ideological sympathy. The possibility of such a tendency was even 
denied by the supporters of Milli Demokratik Devrim (National Democratic 
Revolution) movement of 1960s, whose supporters were persistent to make 
references to the similarities of Bolshevik and Kemalist revolutions. As a notable 
example, Rasih Nuri İleri a leading nationalist figure of Turkish Labor Party in 
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1960s and the founder of National Democratic Revolution Association in 1968. In 
his account, Atatürk ve Komünizm, İleri defines Mustafa Kemal as a reasonable 
leader and a true realist.27 İleri states several reasons for the impossibility of the 
establishment of a Bolshevik regime in Anatolia. For instance, ‘the lack of an 
adequate executive bureaucracy to conduct socialist revolution’ and ‘the inability 
of Atatürk to eliminate landlords and rich merchants, who were the strongest 
supporters of his party’, 28 are accurate points of the author for the impossibility of 
a Bolshevik project in Kemalist regime. Although İleri has some controversial 
claims such as the tendency of Mustafa Kemal to form a government in Anatolia 
under Soviet example29, he does not deny that the Turkish revolutionary leader 
approached Bolsheviks in order to secure the eastern borders and to struggle 
against the same foes.30 
Under these circumstances, the positive statements in the speeches of 
Mustafa Kemal Pasha might be regarded as a necessary strategy to maintain cordial 
relations.31 Apparently, Soviet Union had great expectations for Anatolia at first. A 
very early article published in Izvestiya on April 23, 1920, depicted the unrest in 
Anatolia as the first socialist revolution in Asia.32 However, Lenin recognized that 
Mustafa Kemal was not a communist, and that he was leading a movement with 
bourgeois characteristics, but a valuable ally, as he informed Semion Ivanovich 
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29
 Ibid, p.38 
30
 Ibid, p.39 
31
 The messages sent from Mustafa Kemal to Lenin were later published even in the earliest Soviet 
accounts. For instance, see: I.V.Kluchnikov–A. Sabanin, Mezhdunarodnaya Politika noveishevo 
vremeni v dogovarokh notakh i deklaratsiakh (Moscow: 1925–1928), quoted in Jane Degras, 
Calendar of Soviet documents on foreign policy 1917-1941 (London; New York: Royal Institute, 
1948), p.43 
32
 Stefanos Yerasimos, Ekim Devrimi’nden “Millî Mücadele”ye Türk-Sovyet İlişkileri (İstanbul: 
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Aralov,33 the first ambassador of RSFSR to Ankara. Mustafa Kemal was conscious 
of value of the Soviet aid, as Bolsheviks were in a desperate situation 
economically. 
Mustafa Kemal’s cordial attitude towards Bolsheviks was a milestone in the 
history of Turco-Russian relations. The diplomatic messages of Kemal would be 
later mentioned in Soviet historical accounts as a sign of his positive perception for 
the Russian Revolution and his role as a staunch ally.34 Aralov later became a close 
figure to Mustafa Kemal and joined him in several journeys in the countryside. 
During these journeys, Aralov had much time to have long conversations with the 
leader of the Turkish revolution. Aralov mentions about Mustafa Kemal’s 
intimacy, as once he thanked Soviet Union not to demand mandate or vassalization 
from Turkey in return for their aid and praised Bolshevik’s struggle against 
imperialism.35 
After an official visit of Mikhail Vasilyevich Frunze to Ankara representing 
Ukrainian SSR, a speech of Kemal was published in January 4, 1922 in the 
columns of Hâkimiyet-i Milliye, the official newspaper of revolutionaries.  
Turkey and the Turks, who were incurred to the most violent offenses of the 
imperialism, knew that there were nations struggling against the same ambitions 
across the Black Sea.36 
 
The careful diplomacy of Mustafa Kemal Pasha was essential, as the 
relations between Kemalists and Bolsheviks were still vulnerable. For instance, 
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Kemalist diplomatic mission in Moscow jeopardized the ongoing good relations 
in April 1922, when they were connived a diplomatic scandal with British and 
Polish diplomats.37 For this reason, it is almost impossible to determinate the 
extent of Mustafa Kemal Pasha’s intimacy to approach Bolsheviks. On the 
contrary, the Soviet deputy commissar for foreign affairs, Lev Mikhailovich 
Karahan, did not extend the problem and the commissar for foreign affairs, 
Georgy Vasilyevich Chicherin, joined Lausenne Conference in 1923 as an ardent 
supporter of Turkish claims. 
 
 
2.2.2. A Janus-Headed Stance towards the Bolsheviks (1923–1939): 
 
The war-time partnership with Bolsheviks could not entirely divert the 
Turkish political behavior towards the Soviet Union and to the internal 
communists. It seemed that the mistrust of Turks against the Russian Empire did 
not wane, because Turkey never regarded Moscow as the unique alternative in its 
foreign policy. Since the Lausanne Conference, Turkey had signaled its intention 
to remain neutral between the Soviet Union and the West. The Turkish delegation 
in Lausanne showed limited interest to the Soviet delegation. Even though 
Chicherin had a series of fiery speeches to defend the rights of Turks on the 
Straits, the Ankara delegation avoided establishing a front against the British. 
According to Timothy Edward O'Connor, a biographer of Chicherin, Turkish 
delegation was trying to form a balance between British and Soviet delegations, 
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but it was embarrassed after witnessing Chicherin’s ardent defense of Turkey.38 
Turkish delegation also did not voice a strong protest after the assassination of 
Vaslov Vorovski a member of the Soviet delegation in Lausanne by a former 
officer of the White Army.39  
In fact, the new Turkish government pursued its misgivings for the Soviet 
Union. The ever-suspicions about Russia had the potential to transform into 
hostility against communism (bolshevism). The government took positive 
measures to prevent Soviet propaganda, as it banned several newspapers 
published in Turkish language and printed in the Soviet Union; such as Yeni Fikir 
(New Idea) 40 in July, Yeni Hayat (New Life), Rençber (Farmer), Kommunist, and 
Başkurt 41  in September 1923. These were only an overture for what was in store 
in the future. Moreover, the government not only forbade Soviet publications. In 
1925, the Vienna edition of International Press Correspondence, the official 
publication of the Third International (Comintern), was banned to be brought into 
Turkey.42 This indicates the unwillingness of the government for a cultural – 
ideological rapprochement with the Soviet Union. However, Turkey felt that it did 
not have many alternatives among the great powers, after the Mosul conflict was 
resolved in favor of the Great Britain. The Security and Friendship Treaty 
between Turkey and the Soviet Union in 1925 was signed on December 17, 1925, 
uncoincidentally just one day after the League of Nations’ resolution over the 
status of Mosul. 
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  The intolerance of the Turkish state against communist activities was not 
reflected into the relations between the countries. Although state leaders did not 
have any sympathy for communists inside Turkey, their perspective for the Soviet 
Union was generally positive. After the two new treaties, the Trade and 
Navigation Agreement of 1927, and the 1929 Protocol for the extension of the 
1925 Treaty,43 Lev Karahan visited Turkey. In a telegraph dated 15 December 
1929, Prime Minister İsmet (İnönü) informed Mustafa Kemal about the 
negotiations between him, Lev Karahan, and foreign minister Tevfik Rüştü 
(Aras), stating that he felt cordiality in Karahan’s attitude and therefore he was 
convinced after the conversation with the Soviet representative.44 
The spread of the influence of the Great Depression to young republic 
encouraged Atatürk to survive the crisis by a new leap, allowing a party for 
opposition. However, the unexpected consequence of this new trial (Free Party) 
motivated government to legislate the rigid law of press in 1931, which enabled 
the Turkish state to close any newspaper or periodical if it was regarded harmful 
for the state interests.45 On the other hand, Kemalist state desired closer economic 
relations with the Soviet Union after 1929. Thus, improvements in the economic 
ties between Turkey and the Soviet Union in early 1930s would cause a strict 
inspection over publications about the Soviet Union. 
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After İnönü’s visit to Moscow in 1932, Soviets accepted to lend 8 million 
dollars ‘interest-free’ credit in exchange agricultural products, in addition 
technical support to Turkey both for the preparation of Soviet-style ‘5 year 
economic plans’ and the assignment of technical labor in projected factories in 
Turkey.46 This loan played an essential role for Turkey, as the government used 
this to buy weapons for defense.47 Before the payment in 1934, a Soviet 
delegation led by Kliment Yefremovich Voroshilov (People's Commissar for 
Military and Navy Affairs of the time) organized an official visit to Ankara on 
October 29, 1933, the tenth anniversary of the declaration of the Turkish 
Republic. During the visit, young Soviet director Sergey Iosipovich Yutkevich 
(1904-1985) filmed the celebrations and made his movie Ankara – Serdtse Turtsii 
(Ankara – Heart of Turkey). 
In fact, the Soviet credit would remain marginal after 1938 in comparison 
to the loans from Germany, which had reached 150 million Deutsche Marks.48 
However, the Soviet Union was the mere hope for Turkey for loans until 
Montreux Convention. Although the Turkish proposal was supported and praised 
by Maksim Maksimovich Litvinov,49 the Soviet commissar for foreign affairs 
would soon recognize that the Turkish tendency was to approach Great Britain. 
This would cause a sudden decline in relations, as Tevfik Rüştü Aras, who was 
considered as a pro-Soviet figure, faced with a cold reception in his visit to Soviet 
Union in 1937.50  
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As a matter of fact, the fluctuations in relations directly influenced 
governmental tolerance to published works about the Soviet Union in newspapers 
and periodicals. Leftist journals such as Resimli Ay (Illustrated Monthly), 
published by Sabiha - Zekeriya Sertel couple, had enjoyed a relatively undisturbed 
period. Resimli Ay had been previously subjected to state prosecution twice, firstly 
sent to Independence Courts51 in 1925, and secondly subjected to prosecution in 
1929, having accused of insulting Turkish identity.52 It was not a coincidence that 
the first socialist-realist novel of Turkish literature, Çıkrıklar Durunca (As the 
Spinning Wheels Stopped),53 by Sadri Etem Erdem was published in 1931. Any 
kind of anti-Soviet worldview, especially the Pan-Turkist publications, which 
were previously outlawed and replaced by an official nationalism, had to face 
persecution. In midst of 1930s many Turkic émigré intellectuals from the ex-
Tsarist empire were either expelled (such as Zeki Velidî Togan) or voluntarily left 
Turkey to publish their works abroad. Until 1940s, it is almost impossible to see 
the words Turan, Turkistan, Azerbaijan, which could pose a threat for the fragile 
relations with the Soviet Union. Government banned the importation of several 
Pan-Turkist publications, such as Yaş Türkistan 54 (published in Paris), and the 
works of Azerbaijani politicians Mirza Bala Mehmetzâde (Kutluk) 55 and 
Mehmed Emin Resulzâde56 published in Berlin.  
In addition, the prominent members of Atatürk’s inner circle, such as 
İsmet İnönü and parliamentary Yakup Kadri Karaosmanoğlu (1889-1974) wrote 
in Kadro (Cadre) journal from 1932 to 1934, which was under the strong 
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influence of two Marxist journalists, Şevket Süreyya Aydemir (1897-1976) and 
Vedat Nedim Tör (1897-1985). In fact, later researchers, who analyzed the 
ideological structure of Kadro movement showed that the main proposal of the 
Kadro movement was not the establishment of socialist model in Turkey.57 
According to Mustafa Türkeş, they observed the Soviet system to understand NEP 
and centrally planned economy, as they later offered land reform in order to 
provide solidarity with peasants.58  
 During 1930s, the Turkish government seemed to follow a Janus-headed 
policy, as they aimed to distinguish the governmental pressure over communism 
from ongoing intimate relations with the Soviet Union. During the re-
establishment of cordial relations with the Soviet Union in early 1930s, the state 
pressure over communists eased to some extent, while the deterioration of the 
relations motivated state to increase its inspections over the internal communist 
propaganda. In a cabinet resolution dated August 17, 1931, four journals and 
newspapers; Yeni Kafkas, Otlu Yurt, Bildiriş, and Azeri Türk; were closed because 
of provocative publications about a “friendly neighbor of Turkey.”59 On the other 
hand, another official document shows that state intelligence had a very cautious 
eye on the communist movement in the country even during 1932, at the peak of 
relations with the Soviet Union.60 The Janus-headed policy of state is visible in 
another notable document, which informs that the state authorities had 
investigated a Soviet propaganda film gifted by the Soviet embassy in Ankara, 
showing the official visit of İsmet İnönü to Moscow in 1932. The author of the 
document, inspector Rahmi, reported that the film includes obvious signs of 
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Bolshevik propaganda, but state should not ban the film in order not to disturb the 
Soviet embassy.61  
Especially during the period of uncertainty between 1936 and 1939, the 
Turkish state had efforts to control the public perspective about the Soviet Union. 
In September 1938, the government ordered the suppression of several communist 
publications62 four days after the official permission to Ulus (the official organ of 
the ruling RPP) to print information about the economic developments in the 
Soviet Union.63 Thus, the Kemalist state had a special concern to control press at 
least in order to prevent any kind of non-Kemalist propaganda that could harm 
interior and foreign policy of the government. 
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CHAPTER III 
 
 
FROM THE SECOND WORLD WAR TO STALIN’S 
DEATH: BEGINNING OF THE ANTI-SOVIETISM IN 
TURKISH PRESS 
 
 
 
3.1. From the End of Turco-Soviet Honeymoon to 1945: 
 
The Turco-Soviet relations had a gradual deterioration period from the 
Montreux Convention (1936) to the Crisis of the Straits (1945). As it has been 
mentioned, the Kemalist perspective for the Soviet Union was quite positive 
before 1936, especially in press. It was usual to see several articles in Turkish 
newspapers, which praised the Soviet Union or Soviet statesmen. For instance, in 
1935, Vyacheslav Mikhailovich Molotov, who would be ‘the villain of 1945 
Crisis’ had been praised several times in the Turkish press for his supreme 
qualities and his contributions to the Turco-Soviet friendship.64 However, 
Atatürk’s death put an end to the the foreign ministry of pro-Soviet Aras, who 
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held the office for 12 years. The appointment of Şükrü Saraçoğlu, was a sign of a 
drastic change in the relations.65  
Şükrü Saraçoğlu led a diplomatic mission to Moscow, in order to sign a 
pact with the Soviet Union. However, the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact had been 
signed one month before Saraçoğlu’s arrival to Moscow. Therefore, a pact 
between Turkey, Great Britain, France, and the Soviet Union became impossible. 
The mission could not dare to accept the Soviet proposal for a triple alliance 
between the Nazi Germany, the Soviet Union, and Turkey,66 as the İnönü 
administration had already accepted an alliance with Great Britain and France. 
This meant the end of the Turco-Soviet partnership, after which the Turkish state 
would feel itself free to choose either British or German side. 
Government had to be careful between German and the Soviet Union for 
the sake of neutrality. Therefore, Ulus followed a careful policy of publication, 
while other newspapers was about to divide into pro-Axis and pro-Allied camps. 
Especially during the first month of the Operation Barbarossa, the sudden increase 
in the number of Anti-Soviet articles disturbed governmental authorities. In an 
official instruction Prime Minister Refik Saydam ordered the Istanbul Press Office 
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to take measures against these ‘unpleasant’ publications.67 Turkish side initially 
planned to maintain their quasi-docile attitude towards Moscow, but the 
unexpected German victories confused their minds. In addition, it is mostly 
claimed that the number of the supporters of Germany were higher than those of 
others in Turkish bureaucracy and bourgeoisie,68 after German progress. It should 
not be dismissed that Germany was the only great power which did not declare 
war upon Turkey and memories from the First World War partnership were still 
fresh. However, this was not enough to explain the support to Germany from the 
majority of press between 1941 and 1943, after Yunus Nadi Abalıoğlu, editorial 
writer of Cumhuriyet, had published an article, accusing the Western Allies with 
hypocrisy as they had to help Russia, their number two enemy yesterday. After 
Yunus Nadi’s article, Cumhuriyet continued to publish articles, praising German 
victories in the Eastern front.69  
 
 
3.2. The ‘Tan - Tanin’ Clash under the Shadow of the Straits Crisis:  
 
The Second World War caused mutual mistrust between Turkey and the 
Soviet Union and resulted with a political conflict between these governments. 
The Soviet decision to terminate the Security and Friendship Treaty between 
Turkey and the Soviet Union in 1925 caused a great fear among the Turks. The 
result was the defection of Turkey to the Western camp.  
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In addition, the political crisis between Turkey and the Soviet Union also 
triggered a domestic clash in the Turkish press between the newspapers of Tan 
and Tanin. This was the first example in the Turkish press, in which newspapers 
actively contended to shape the perspective of the public opinion in different 
camps, during a foreign policy crisis. In the first scene, the quarrel aroused 
between Tan and Tanin newspapers, which resulted with the end of the former. In 
the second part, Tan was closed and Hüseyin Cahit Yalçın (1875-1957), editorial 
writer of Tanin, published a series of anti-Soviet articles, which also signaled the 
political direction of the RPP government at the beginning of the Cold War. 
The first publication of Tanin was between 1908 and 1925. During this 
time, Hüseyin Cahit’s newspaper was a supporter of the Committee of Union and 
Progress Party (CUP) until the newspaper was closed in 1925, during Kemalists’ 
suppression of the former CUP members. Hüseyin Cahit was sentenced to a 
lifetime exile in Çorum70 after being arrested and stayed in the same prison cell 
with Zekeriya Sertel.71 Yalçın returned to party politics after Atatürk’s death upon 
İnönü’s invitation. After his rehabilitation, Tanin rejoined the Turkish press, this 
time as a supporter of governmental policies. 
Tan was an exceptional newspaper in Turkey during the first half of 
1940s. The newspaper was firstly founded as a publication of Türkiye İş Bankası 
(İşbank), but gained its prominence after being bought by two famous and 
somewhat oppositional journalists of the time, Mehmet Zekeriya Sertel (1890-
1980), and Ahmet Emin Yalman (1888-1972). Later, Yalman would terminate his 
contract with Zekeriya Sertel and establish Vatan in early 1940s. 
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Zekeriya Sertel was one of the first journalists received education on 
journalism in the United States with his wife, Sabiha Sertel (1895-1968), who was 
a well-known Marxist and a pioneer of feminism in Turkey. Their publication 
career began in 1919 with a weekly journal, Büyük Mecmua 72 and continued with 
Resimli Ay from 1924 to 1931. This was a monthly illustrated magazine in 
American style but it also had a strong political content, which could even disturb 
the state authorities, as it was mentioned. Resimli Ay initially followed a liberal 
path until 1929. In this year, the Sertel couple hired Nâzım Hikmet Ran73 (1902-
1963) as a redactor and the journal summoned many young leftist authors such as, 
Sabahattin Ali (1907-1948), Sadri Etem Erdem (1898-1943), and Suat Derviş 
(1903-1972).74 This caused a conflict between Sertels and the concessionaires of 
the journal which would lead to the end of its publication. Sabiha and Zekeriya 
Sertel returned to press with Tan as well-known journalists.  
The importance of Tan was its oppositional stance during the Second 
World War, first against pro-Axis newspapers in press, and later against the ‘so-
called’ pro-democratic newspapers. Although Tan would be labeled by its rivals 
as the center of communist propaganda, the majority of Zekeriya Sertel’s articles 
in his daily column indicated that he presented himself as a supporter of the 
Atlantic Charter 1941.75 In other words, Zekeriya Sertel concurrently praised the 
Western Allies and the Soviet Union against the supporters of the Axis. 
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In her column, Sabiha Sertel mostly evaluated the internal problems of the 
country during war time. She discussed various problems rotationally with her 
husband such as the bread shortage,76 the privileges given to the high officials of 
RPP,77 bribery,78 and even the destructive consequences of the 1942 property tax 
(or capital levy).79 The acts of the Sertel couple were quite audacious, while other 
newspapers adapt their publications to official RPP policies. Therefore, their 
articles attracted a harsh criticism from the pro-government journalists. Although 
Tan published positive comments about Soviet regime both in the columns of 
Sertels and translated articles from the western press,80 but these did not bring a 
furious reaction until 1945. After Stalin’s speech, in which he celebrated the 26th 
anniversary of the October Revolution, Zekeriya Sertel stated that “this could be 
considered as a forerunner for all nations, which long for their freedom and 
independence.” 81 Either being frank or producing his articles on a special 
purpose, Zekeriya Sertel’s optimism was excessive about the Soviet Union, as he 
even claimed that the Soviet Union aimed at the democratization of “tiny nations” 
instead of Bolshevization.82 Although his comments were equally optimistic about 
the American contribution to world peace, he previously offered an alliance with 
the Soviet Union.83 This probably played an essential role behind the accusations 
of receiving support from the Soviet Union.   
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After the invasion of Normandy, Sertels stepped up their pro-Allied 
propaganda with a careful language. While Zekeriya Sertel warned the 
government about the time to join war84 and applauded the victories of both 
Americans and Russians, the Turkish government was preparing its policies for 
the post-war period. In Turkish historiography, Turkey’s accession to Western 
Alliance is generally assessed with the ‘unexpected’ Soviet threat in 1945. 
However, some accounts claim that İnönü tried to exploit the Soviet aggression to 
diminish internal dissent against his government, because exhausted patience of 
the people must have directed the president to implement new strategies to 
maintain his control. The easiest way to call people to solidarity was to foment 
fear against an ‘evil’ foe, which wanted to invade Turkey unjustly.85 Sertels and 
Tan must have been the first victims of the government, after Sertel couple 
(mainly Sabiha Sertel) found themselves in a harsh quarrel with RPP deputy 
Hüseyin Cahit Yalçın and his newspaper Tanin.  
As it has been mentioned, Zekeriya Sertel expressed his personal comment 
in favor of an alliance either with the Soviet Union or the Westen Allies. In the 
midst of 1944, his perspective became more pro-Soviet, as he questioned the 
possibility of an alliance between Turkey and the Soviet Union. There was no 
initial reaction to Zekeriya Sertel’s ideas, because the possible attitude of the 
government was still uncertain, while Soviet Russia still fought in the Allied front. 
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During the first days of 1945, both government and press expressed their 
sympathy to Russia.86 
In Tanin’s editorial article, published on January 15, 1945, Hüseyin Cahit 
Yalçın, wrote overblown praises for the ‘moral power’ of the Red Army, and 
stated that the Soviet Empire would be the most glorious empire of the world, if 
they were eager to bear the honorary flag of peace.87 This was quite meaningful in 
terms of the expectations of the Turkish government from Stalin on the eve of the 
Yalta Conference. Eventually, Turkish government had been alarmed by the 
intentions of Allies to accept Stalin’s demand for amendments in the Montreux 
regime on the Straits in Yalta.88 After the conference, the İnönü government 
seemed to wait for some time to leave their friendly stance towards Soviet Russia, 
as three deputy journalists of RPP; Necmettin Sadık Sadak (1890-1953), Falih 
Rıfkı Atay (1894-1971) and Hüseyin Cahit Yalçın launched an anti-Soviet 
campaign in their newspapers, Akşam, Ulus, and Tanin. This must have been the 
consequence of a planning process, because Yalçın’s attitude was still calm after 
the Soviet rejection for the extension of the 1925 Treaty on March 7, 1945. On 
April, Yalçın still wrote that Russian behavior was normal in diplomatic terms 
and he did not believe that Soviets were planning an exploitative treaty like 
Hünkâr İskelesi (1833).89  
Against the staunch bloc of the RPP controlled press, Tan could be 
considered as the unique bastion of the opposition, but Zekeriya Sertel’s 
perspective on the Straits regime did not contrast with the RPP journalists. For 
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instance, Zekeriya Sertel also expressed his anxiety for Anglo-American support 
for the Soviet demands during the planned conference in Germany.90 After the 
electoral victory of Clement Attlee in the Great Britain, he even supported 
Yalçın’s idea for a triple alliance between the British, Russians and the Turks.91 
Beginning from June 28, 1945, Zekeriya Sertel and Hüseyin Cahit Yalçın 
continuously criticized each other in their columns.92 As a matter of fact, the 
polemic between Sabiha – Zekeriya Sertel and Hüseyin Cahit Yalçın was not 
merely based on the Straits Question, as it was supposed. The articles of the 
Sertels must have been disturbed the government. Especially Sabiha Sertel 
directed her sharp pen to the former Nazi supporters in the bureaucracy, explicitly 
to the Pan-Turkists, who did not face state persecution, until the government 
decided to side with the Allies.93 Criticism of Sabiha Sertel became fiercer during 
the 1945 fall. Sabiha Sertel began to criticize RPP harshly, due to its protection of 
some party members, who previously supported fascism.94 The joint criticism of 
the Sertel couple even included negative comments about the autocratic 
implementation of some of the Kemalist reforms, such as the language reform.95 
The patience of RPP was probably exhausted after the brave accusations of the 
Sertel couple about the insufficiency of RPP to establish democracy.96 On the 
opposite side, Yalçın wrote several articles with a careful language, pretending to 
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be respectful to the Sertels in order to mask his harsh criticism partially. At first, 
he claimed that Moscow Radio had blamed Turkey to maintain fascist aspects in 
its regime97 and later gradually indicated the so-called parallels between the 
Sertels and Moscow Radio.98 After an anti-fascist article by Sabiha Sertel,99 
Yalçın asked Sabiha Sertel whether she was a Muscovite, due to labeling all 
Soviet oppositionists as fascist.100 
After the November attacks of Sertels, the fury of both sides suddenly 
increased, as Sabiha Sertel criticized Yalçın for his intolerance to opposition,101 
while the latter blamed Sertels for being rebellious against the authority of the 
parliament.102 Yalçın also published speculative news about the support of 
Moscow behind Zekeriya Sertel.103 This quarrel ended with a well-known tragedy 
in Turkish press history. A provocative article entitled Kalkın Ey Ehli Vatan! (The 
Sons of the Fatherland, Arise!), by an anonymous author, was published on 
Tanin’s first page on December 3, 1945. The article targeted Sabiha Sertel’s two 
articles in their periodical Görüşler and implied the urgency of action against the 
‘traitors.’104 Consequently, printing house of Sertels was busted by a furious mob 
of students on December 4, 1945. The Sertel couple was barely escaped from 
being lynched. Thus, publication career of the Sertel couple in Turkey was 
finalized.105 
 Beyond speculations, it was true that the majority of the articles written 
by the Sertel couple praised Soviet Union for its role in the allied camp, but 
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Zekeriya Sertel also continued to praise the US government’s role for the world 
peace until the last days of Tan.106 However, Tan’s absence had a great 
contribution to pro-American propaganda of the government during late 1940s. In 
fact, Turkey had a great diplomatic success in the Straits Crisis to convince the 
Truman government for Stalin’s prospective aggressions. In his memoires, 
Feridun Cemal Erkin, who was the undersecretary of the Turkish ministry of 
foreign affairs at the time, confessed that Turkey would be ready to accept the 
revision of Montreux Convention even in favor of the Soviet interests, unless the 
Americans changed their policy, and Turkey’s acceptation was informed to US 
government on December 6, 1945.107 
The Crisis of the Straits, which had begun with Molotov’s explicit 
declaration of Soviet demands from Turkey for the revision of Montreux and 
opening of Soviet military bases on the Straits for common defence later vaned, 
but another implicit pressure from the Soviet Union, as the expression of the 
theoretical rights of the Georgian SSR on the cities Kars and Ardahan in the 
Soviet press,108 opened the second phase of the crisis in 1946. The material and 
political capability of the Soviet Union to launch an invasion on Turkey is 
questionable, but it might have been regarded as a golden opportunity for 
government both to request funds from Marshall Aid, and to deal with the post-
war dissent in the society, around the idea of solidarity of the nation against a 
historical ‘evil’ neighbor. After Tan was silenced, Yalçın and his colleagues in 
Ulus and Akşam obtained a wider place to foment anti-Soviet sentiment in Turkish 
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public opinion. At this point, several older aspects of anti-Russianism would have 
a great revival, but the Crisis of the Straits became a notorious stereotype among 
the Turkish journalists until 1960s.  
During 1946, Yalçın brought the flag of the ‘so-called democratic’ forces. 
One week after the Tan Incident, he stressed the protest of the Soviet Ambassador 
Sergey Aleksandrovich Vinogradov about the demolition of Tan Printhouse. He 
continued to attack Soviet government with a harsh language, once even calling 
Soviet Foreign Minister Andrey Yanuaryevich Vyshinsky as a ‘new Hitler.’ 109  
Four points are quite important to analyze the characteristics of the 
behavior of Turkish press during the Crisis of the Straits. First, the influence of 
press was considered serious both in Turkey and abroad. The aggressive language 
of Hüseyin Cahit Yalçın disturbed the Soviet government and caused an official 
warning from Vinogradov.110 Second, Turkish press continuously stressed the 
arrogance of the Soviet Russia to offer common defense of the Straits as an attack 
to Turkish national sovereignty from 1945 to 1960s. However, later documents 
denoted that the idea of common defense had been first offered by the Turkish 
delegation in Lausanne to Chicherin; it was but refused by the Soviet 
government.111 Third, the respectful attitude of Turkish press to Soviet Union 
from 1920s to 1944  had a very sudden change. For instance, Yalçın mentioned 
the partnership between Turkish revolutionaries and Bolsheviks against common 
western foes on April 1945,112 but he named the same partnership as a “myth that 
had to be refuted” at the end of the same year.113  
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The fourth and the most important point is the uncertainty of the influence 
of pro-Soviet stance of Tan over the governmental hatred for the Sertel couple, 
because Zekeriya Sertel never criticized the governmental behavior of Turkey in 
terms of foreign policy during the crisis. The only difference between pro-RPP 
editorial writers and Zekeriya Sertel was the assessment of the circumstances. For 
Zekeriya Sertel, there was not a crisis and Turkey could easily obtain American 
support to resist the Soviet Union.114 Moreover, Zekeriya Sertel expressed a 
realist comment about the tension, stating that Turkey should make sacrifices if 
the Western Allies had accepted Soviet demands.115 In his last article about the 
Straits Question, he expressed his disappointment about the aggressive and 
impatience attitude of the US government in the crisis, which could damage 
Turkey’s will to solve the problem giving the least possible concessions.116 
Although Yalçın blamed Sabiha Sertel to praise the Soviet Union, he signaled her 
article in the first issue of the journal Görüşler, in which Sertels also published the 
heavy criticism of Mahmut Celâl Bayar and Ali Adnan Menderes, who had newly 
left from RPP and founded DP. As it had been mentioned, especially Sabiha 
Sertel’s harsh criticism about the corruption of the RPP bureaucracy was carefully 
observed and responded by the governmental newspapers. Tan Incident was also a 
warning for the four founders of DP, who were supported by Sertels. Although the 
founders of DP did not back Sertels after the disaster, Yalçın and the rest of the 
RPP journalists were ready to direct their bows of criticism towards the 
democrats. In May 1946, Yalçın claimed that Celâl Bayar had an interview with 
an American newspaper, in which he denied any kind of Soviet threat.117 In the 
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article, Yalçın implicitly questioned whether Bayar had supported the Soviet 
Union. This was a forerunner of Yalçın’s next campaign. On July 13, a long 
furious manifest was published on the first page the Tanin, which claimed that the 
so-called ‘Red-Fascists’ of DP were supported by the Moscow Radio and RPP is 
the only savior of the country from the Soviet threat.118 Three days later, Yalçın 
asked the comments of DP members about the [so-called] resistance of RPP 
against Soviet demands over the Straits and the eastern provinces, accusing them 
of remaining silent.119 It was not difficult to see the connection between Yalçın’s 
accusations with the upcoming elections on July 21, 1946.  
 
 
3.3. From the Straits of the Crisis to Stalin’s Death 
 
The Straits Crisis was resolved briefly after the revelation of American 
attitude. After the first gestures of the United States, such as the famous visit of 
USS Missouri to Istanbul, Turkey included into Marshall Plan in 1948 and later 
applied NATO for full membership.120 With Turkey’s defection into Western 
Camp, the Soviet pressure over Turkey changed its shape gradually and 
transformed into a typical Cold War rivalry. On the other hand, the pro-American 
foreign policy of Turkey was perhaps the only common aspect of RPP and DP, as 
the preferences of the former were maintained by the latter. In addition, the DP 
                                               
118
 Hüseyin Cahid Yalçın, “Bolşevikler Maskeyi Yüzlerinden Attılar” Tanin, 13 July 1945; Nilgün 
Gürkan, Türkiye’de Demokrasiye Geçişte Basın (İstanbul: İletişim, 1998), p.207.   
119
 Hüseyin Cahid Yalçın, “Vatan Menfaati Her Şeyin Fevkındedir” Tanin, 16 July 1946. 
120
 Mehmet Gönlübol & Ömer Kürkçüoğlu, eds., Olaylarla Türk Dış Politikası, (Ankara: Alkım 
Kitabevi, 1989), pp. 238–236.  
 38
rule between 1950 and 1960 was a continuation of anti-Soviet inclination in the 
Turkish press.  
Democratic Party sought the support of all oppositional forces in Turkey 
until their victory in the parliamentary election held on May 14, 1950. Before 
1950, especially the leftist Turkish intellectuals faced governmental persecutions 
especially during the late 1940s. Nazım Hikmet Ran had been in prison since 
1938, despite intense protests in Istanbul and Paris for his release.121 The leftist 
writer Sabahattin Ali was murdered, leaving the doubts of a conspiracy behind his 
death. Sabiha and Zekeriya Sertel had to leave Turkey, while rest of the socialist 
journalists such as Aziz Nesin (1915-1995) had to deal with oppression.122 Many 
leftist professors of the Ankara University, Faculty of Language, History and 
Geography including Niyazi Berkes, his wife Mediha Berkes, Muzaffer Şerif 
Başoğlu, Behice Boran, Pertev Naili Boratav, and İlhan Başgöz were purged in 
1946.123 In this atmosphere, DP seemed as a light of hope for the leftist 
intellectuals. However, they suddenly inherited the anti-communist sentiment 
from RPP. From 1950 to 1953, both RPP and DP newspapers continued to publish 
several anti-Soviet articles. This three-year period also refers to a relatively 
peaceful period between RPP and DP in comparison to the second half of 1950s, 
at least in foreign policy decisions, as both of these parties had a consensus over 
sending Turkish soldiers to Korean War and the membership to NATO.124 
The consensus between RPP and DP also influenced the patterns of DP 
domestic policy, especially the attitude of the new government towards 
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communist movements in the country. Improving relations with the United States 
motivated DP leaders to transform Turkey into an entirely anti-communist regime. 
Menderes government did not terminate the oppression over internal communists 
and the leftist press. Initial tolerance of DP to leftist movements suddenly ended. 
Although they released Nâzım Hikmet, the famous poet had to flee from Turkey 
after he faced another series of persecutions.125 Moreover, the new Prime Minister 
Adnan Menderes made several speeches and denied the existence of communist 
movements in the country, declaring Turkey as a staunch castle in the struggle 
against universal communism. Even though one of the main purposes of 
government and the press was to reflect Turkey as a democratic member of the 
Western alliance, the regime implied policies to struggle internal communism, 
differently from the European democracies, in which communist parties were 
legal and able to lead the cabinets.  
The support of RPP to DP in the struggle against communism also 
influenced the press organs of the country. Until 1953, the Turkish press was like 
a monolithic organ to operate an anti-Soviet propaganda. DP also adopted the 
strategy of RPP to foment external threats to call people to solidarity. Various 
issues about the Soviet Union, such as the cruelty of the Stalinist regime, the 
aggressiveness of the Soviet leaders, the economic problems of the Soviet Empire, 
and indeed the historical ambitions of Russians over Turkey became a part of the 
daily routine in the editorial writers of pro-RPP and pro-DP newspapers. From 
1950 to 1952, the Soviet fear and hatred in the newspapers could be regarded as a 
reasonable reaction, depending on aggressive Soviet reactions towards the 
entrance of Turkey to Korean War and Turkey’s NATO membership. The Soviet 
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criticism became a part of daily routine in the Turkish press. This time, anti-
Soviet statements could be seen any day without regard to a particular crisis in 
Turco-Russian relations.126 
 
 
3.4. Prominent Turkish Newspapers of 1940s and 1950s 
 
The number of Turkish newspapers continuously increased in 1950s. 
Multi-party politics not only triggered the appearance of rival newspapers, 
supporting different political parties, but also foundation of several independent 
newspapers. In this study, eight prominent newspapers were observed, two of 
which, Ulus (The Nation) and Zafer (Victory) were regarded as the official organ 
of the Republican People’s Party and the semi-official propaganda organ of the 
Democratic Party, respectively. The three among them; Cumhuriyet (The 
Republic), Vatan (The Motherland), Dünya (The World), were important political 
newspapers directed by significant editorial writers. Their major difference from 
Ulus and Zafer was their relatively independent structure, which enabled them to 
make some shifts in their political trends. The last three of them, Akşam (The 
Evening), Milliyet (Nationality or Nationhood), and Hürriyet (Freedom) were not 
predominantly political newspapers in comparison to the prior group, but their 
considerable circulation rate gave them a significant place in press. 
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The political perspectives of these newspapers were mostly expressed in 
the daily columns of their editorial writers, many of which were too close to 
political circles. Some of them such as Necmettin Sadık Sadak, the editorial writer 
of Akşam until his death, and Hüseyin Cahit Yalçın, who was the editorial writer 
of Ulus after Tanin, already had a political past in RPP front. Falih Rıfkı Atay, 
another significant figure in RPP as a close colleague of Atatürk had joined 
Dünya of Bedii Faik Akın (1921 - ) and followed a pro-İnönü line in his editorial 
articles until 1960s.  
On the opposite front, Mümtaz Faik Fenik (1904–1974) editorial writer of 
Zafer, was elected to parliament in 1950 from DP. Under the auspices of their pro-
American editor Ahmet Emin Yalman, Vatan praised the government for a long 
time. Although the relations between the government and Yalman deteriorated 
after 1957, Yalman preserved its anti-Soviet stance and he never criticized 
Turkey’s allegiance to NATO and the US government. As one of the oldest and 
most influential newspapers of the republican period, Cumhuriyet followed a 
similar perspective like Vatan. The young editor Nadir Nadi Abalıoğlu (1908-
1991) published several anti-Soviet articles during the first half of 1950s, before 
he shifted his attention to domestic political turmoil of the late 1950s. 
The rising tension in the first decade of the Cold War attracted the 
attention of the Turkish press to the foreign politics. Many Turkish newspapers 
had foreign policy columnists at the first half of 1950s. In addition, these 
newspapers published numerous serial articles, interviews and also feuilletons 
about the characteristics of the Soviet leaders and life in Russia. Majority of these 
did not belong to famous writers; but they were mostly written by western 
journalists, whose names were unfamiliar to Turkish readers.  
 42
The domestic political context of Turkey disabled the emergence of an 
oppositional front against NATO membership of Turkey. The newspaper Tan was 
reopened in 1949, but this time the newspaper was directed by Ali Naci Karacan 
(1896-1955), who shared the anti-communist sentiment with other journalists. In 
the last publication period of Tan, which lasted from 1949 to 1957, the attitude of 
the newspaper towards the Soviet Union was not different from the others. From 
its first days, the newspaper appeared with anti-Soviet headlines and news.127  
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CHAPTER IV 
 
 
THE FEAR OF STALIN’S GHOST: FROM THE 
LEADERSHIP OF MALENKOV TO THE 
HUNGARIAN UPRISING (1953 – 1956) 
 
 
 
4.1. On the Eve of Stalin’s Death (January – February, 1953): 
 
The ‘New Year’ articles of many editors did not include great expectations 
for the year 1953. However, this time the rhetoric of newspapers was not equally 
fiery as it was in 1945. For instance, Necmettin (Sadık) Sadak avoided using an 
aggressive language, although he showed no hope for world peace, unless Stalin’s 
rule ended.128 However, Ahmet Şükrü Esmer (1893-1982), the foreign policy 
columnist of Ulus, stated that Soviet Union could not prevent the so-called “peace 
caravan” of NATO in reference to a pejorative Turkish proverb.129 The harsh 
attacks of Esmer and his boss, Yalçın, would soon be contributed by the most pro-
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American journalist of the time Ahmet Emin Yalman, who was still receiving 
treatment after he survived from an attempt of assassination by a radical Islamist 
student in Malatya on November 22, 1952.130 During his absence, Vatan did not 
stop publishing anti-Soviet news and articles.131 
The first issue about the Soviet Union in the Turkish press at the beginning 
of 1953 was ongoing persecutions in the country. The editors of many major 
newspapers assessed the ‘cruelty’ of Soviet leaders after the arrest of several 
Jewish doctors, who was suspected to poison Stalin. Independent journalists, such 
as Nadir Nadi questioned the reason for this persecution after three decades of 
high reputation of Jews in the “Red Tsardom,”132 while RPP and DP journalists 
expressed their routine animosity, blaming Soviet government with terrorism.133  
 It might be questioned whether the Menderes government adopted the 
methods of RPP to seek popular solidarity to call nation to the so-called fifth 
column of the USSR in Turkey. In his speech in Gaziantep on January 18, 1953, 
Menderes declared Turkey’s decisiveness to struggle with communism.134 
Menderes claimed that the two dangers for the country were the Islamic 
fundamentalists and communists, implying that the radical Islamists might have 
received support from the Soviet Union, also with an implicit attack to National 
Party (NP), who was alleged to support radical Islamists. According to Menderes 
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“the atmosphere of Turkey was impossible to breathe for communists.”135 In fact, 
Islamist movement in Turkey could not have relations with the Soviet Union. The 
majority of Islamist publications, notably Hür Adam (Free Man), and Sebilürreşad 
(The Way of True Path) expressed an extreme hatred for communism.136 The real 
target should have been the NP leader Osman Bölükbaşı, who was a famous 
master of rhetoric and an active figure of the opposition.  
Allegations for the collaboration between communists and Islamists would 
gain eminence after the Gaziantep speech, which was responded by flattering 
remarks in the headlines of Turkish newspapers. The press ardently supported the 
attitude of Menderes to regard all oppositional groups on the same front.137 
Interestingly, one of the praising articles138 was written by the Akşam columnist 
Vâlâ Nureddin Vâ-Nû (1901-1967), who was the closest friend of Nâzım Hikmet 
and joined his long journey to the Soviet Russia139 in 1921. However, Stalin’s 
death would distract the attention of the editors until October before the launch of 
joint anti-NP propaganda of Ulus, Dünya, and Vatan. 
During the last three months of the Stalinist regime, three newspapers 
Ulus, Vatan, and Zafer should be distinguished from the others due to the high 
number of anti-Soviet news and articles, as Yalman’s absence even could not 
diminish the pace of Vatan. Especially feuilletons were quite popular in 1950s as 
a good way of attracting readers. At the height of the Cold War, political 
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feuilletons seemed more popular than non-political ones in the public opinion, as 
it could be observed that the majority of these serial writings were political. 
Another important detail was the proximity of the political attitude of these 
feuilletons with the governmental policies. As a meaningful example, in a typical 
anti-Soviet feuilleton of the time, the author drew attention to Soviet propaganda 
tactic to manipulate religion and religious circles in its first issue.140 Another 
feuilleton, written by an American journalist declared the “treachery of Julius and 
Ethel Rosenberg” to Turkish readers in the pages of Ulus.141 The difference of the 
reaction was obvious between the Doctors’ Plot and the Trial of Rosenbergs.  
Frequent anti-Soviet and anti-communist articles in Ulus142 and Zafer143 
denoted the intolerance of the two major parties towards the communism in 
Turkey. Mümtaz Faik Fenik did not hesitate to stress the relation of his newspaper 
with the government, calling all media to support Menderes.144 Hüseyin Cahit 
Yalçın used pejorative words for the Soviet Union including “fraudulent”145 and 
asserted that the attack could come in any moment. With the return of Yalman,146 
the newspaper retook its place in the struggle against communism. When a rally 
was organized for the workers under the banner ‘the Damnation of Communism,’ 
in Eskişehir on February 22, 1953, Vatan highly appreciated this organization on 
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its headlines.147 Next day, Yalman published an article with high praises for the 
decisiveness of the workers to struggle against communism.148 
One of the most notable columnists of the time was Mehmetzâde Mirza 
Bala, the former Azerbaijani émigré writer, who returned to Turkey after the 
Second World War. At the beginning of 1953, he still published weekly articles 
about the Soviet Union. The main difference of Mirza Bala from other anti-Soviet 
authors was his outstanding knowledge about the Bolshevik Revolution. Mirza 
Bala was the unique columnist, who narrated memoires and special comments 
about many Soviet politicians. In his articles, Bala made several references to a 
variety of events from the February Revolution to the Trotskyist schism149 and the 
personalities of a variety of revolutionary figures from Georgiy Valentinovich 
Plekhanov to Maksim Gorkiy. Although Mirza Bala’s comments were even 
harsher than Yalçın and Yalman, his accounts had a supreme quality due to his 
first hand knowledge over the Soviet politics and politicians. Mirza Bala usually 
stated the impossibility of democratic reform in Russia, which never had a 
democratic tradition.150 Unlike his pro-American colleagues, Mirza Bala even 
criticized the optimism of Harry S. Truman.151 Mirza Bala wrote his anti-Soviet 
articles in Milliyet rotationally with Hüseyin Hüsnü Emir Erkilet, a retired Major 
General in the Turkish army and a prominent pro-German Pan-Turkist of 1940s, 
who even had an intimate contact wih von Papen.152 Erkilet’s attitude was also 
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pro-American, therefore appropriate to the general atmosphere of the Turkish 
press, although it was also possible to see implicit justifications for Hitler’s 
ideology.153    
In terms of the immense rise of anti-Sovietism in press, the period from 
May 14, 1950 to March 5, 1953 was exceptional. The last three month period also 
bore the routine characteristics of anti-Sovietism. Aggressive editorials, full of 
anti-Soviet criticism and pejorative cartoons154 on the front pages could be seen 
any day without regard to a particular incident in Turco-Soviet relations.155 
 
 
4.2. Pessimism after Stalin’s Death (March – September, 1953) 
 
The unexpected death of Stalin suddenly changed the agenda of the press. 
Akşam (an evening newspaper), was first to declare the death of the terrifying 
dictator on its headlines.156 Akşam was also the only newspaper, which had a calm 
reaction after Stalin’s death.157 However, the other newspapers explicitly showed 
their hatred for Stalin. For instance, Hürriyet, which was usually criticized as 
being a somewhat tabloid newspaper, was also among these newspapers. Sedat 
Simavi (1896-1953), in the editorial of Hürriyet, wrote as follows.  
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According to a rumor, Stalin has been in agony. According to 
another rumor, the villainous red dictator had already kicked 
the bucket. I wish the ‘red dictator’ had recovered for a short 
time after a long moribundity and find a chance to read all 
about him in world press, before he deliver his soul to the 
Angel of Death… Now, the entire Free World is in joy.158 
 
 
With the verification of the Stalin’s death by the Soviet officials, H.C. 
Yalçın,159 F.R. Atay,160 and M.F. Fenik,161 expressed their comments about the 
hopelessness for a change in the Soviet regime. Only A.E. Yalman was somewhat 
optimistic, stating his wishes for the end of the “Cruel Muscovitism.”162 
During the following days, Stalin’s death maintained its position as the 
main topic in the Turkish press. In March, all newspapers were full of articles, 163 
and feuilletons164 about Stalin, which included quite pejorative statements. An 
interesting detail was the criticism of the Stalinist regime by all means, even 
including the perspective of the Trotskyism.165  
Although the new Soviet Premier Georgy Maksimilianovich Malenkov 
seemed in favor of the maintenance of the world peace in his declarations,166 the 
                                               
158
 “Bir rivayete göre Stalin can çekisiyormus. Başka bir rivayete göre evlere şenlik kızıl diktatör 
çoktan kuyruğu titretmiş... İsterdim ki kızıl diktatör epeyce can çekistikten sonra biraz kendine 
gelsin ve ruhunu teslim etmeden evvel dünya matbuatının kendisi için neler yazdığını 
okusun…Bütün hür dünya şimdi sevinç içindedir.” See: Sedat Simavi “Evlere Şenlik” Hürriyet, 5 
March 1953. 
159
 Hüseyin Cahit Yalçın, “Stalin’den Sonra Çok Değişiklik Beklemiyoruz” Ulus, 5 March 1953; 
idem, “Büyük Hata” Ulus, 6 March 1953. 
160
 Falih Rıfkı Atay, “İstalinsiz Rusya” Dünya, 6 March 1953, idem, “İstalin Öldükten Sonra” 
Dünya, 7 March 1953. 
161
 Mümtaz Faik Fenik, “Stalin ve Sonrası…” Zafer, 6 March 1953; idem, “Stalin’in Nabzı Durdu 
Fakat…” Zafer, 7 March 1953. 
162
 Ahmet Emin Yalman, “Bir Sayfa Kapandı” Vatan, 6 March 1953; idem, “Şer Yolunun 
Yolcusu” Vatan, 7 March 1953.  
163
 Mirza Bala, “Stalin’in Asıl Hüviyeti” Milliyet, 7 March 1953; H. E. Erkilet, “Stalinden Sonra” 
Milliyet, 8 March 1953; idem, “Stalinin Ölümünden Sonra” Milliyet, 11 March 1953; Şükrü Kaya, 
“Stalin İhtilâlci” Hürriyet, 8 March 1953; idem, “Stalin Diktatör” Hürriyet, 10 March 1953; M. 
Feridun Bellisar,  “Stalin’den Sonraki Rusya” Hürriyet, 9 March 1953. 
164
 “Kızıl Müşavirin Acı Pişmanlığı” Akşam, 13 March 1953; W. Averell Harriman  & George W. 
Herald, “Stalin ve Stalin’den Sonra Rusya, Vatan, 18 March 1953; The feuilletons mostly 
emphasized on Stalin’s illegal past, depicting him as a bank robber. See: “Stalin” Ulus, 14 – 31 
March 1953.  
165
 “Kızıl Diktatörlüğün Mirası Nasıl Pay Edilir” [from Trotsky’s memoires] Zafer, 6 – 9 March 
1953; Ahmet Şükrü Esmer, “Stalinizm” Ulus, 7 March 1953. 
166
 Bilge, Suat, Güç Komşuluk: Türkiye-SovyetlerBirliği İlişkileri (1920-1964) (Ankara: Türkiye İş 
Bankası Yayınları, 1992), pp.338–339.  
 50
Turkish press preserved its pessimism about Malenkov.167 However, the 
aggressive – incredulous stance of the American Foreign Minister John Foster 
Dulles was appreciated in the headlines of the Turkish newspapers.168 
Another notable discussion was the future of Malenkov’s rule. For many 
people, Malenkov would not leave Stalin’s path.169 Only Mirza Bala questioned 
the leadership qualities and capabilities of Malenkov, asserting that he was quite 
“insufficient to be a new Stalin.”170 In general, the majority of the journalists 
affirmed that they were hopeless for the pacification between the superpowers, but 
it was doubtful whether they were aware of the real circumstances of the Cold 
War. For instance, Yalçın mentioned that the best solution was to give ultimatum 
to North Korea and Communist China instead of an invasion in the Soviet Union, 
as if it was possible for NATO to launch an invasion into the Soviet Union.171 
In spite of the prevalent misgivings about Malenkov, the Soviet Union sent 
a peaceful verbal note to Turkey on May 30, 1953, and declared that they 
relinquished the territorial claims of the Georgian and the Armenian SSR over 
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Eastern Anatolia.172 However, the Turkish government did not regard this move 
as an intimate attempt for peace, but a tactical change in the Soviet plans.173 The 
perspective of the government seemed to have a direct influence over the press. 
Before the Soviet move, many editors (notably Yalçın) reproached the possible 
supporters of a rapprochement with the Soviet Union. Yalçın even condemned the 
Western world, who he thought was fooled by the Soviet Union.174 He expressed 
that Turkey was the first country, which really perceived the Soviet threat.175 In 
fact, the attitude of the press was parallel to the government’s stance, as it could 
be seen in the articles about the official visit of Dulles to Turkey at the end of 
May. This visit was praised in all newspapers and the independent newspapers.176 
On the other hand, the Menderes government did not seem willing to inform the 
Turkish press about its negotiations with the Soviet Union. Even Zafer seemed 
uninformed, if it had been ordered by the government circles to keep the Soviet 
note as a secret.  
The Soviet note was published on the headlines of the Turkish newspapers 
on June 11, when foreign agencies informed the Turkish press after the Paris 
Radio informed its listeners about the new diplomatic attacks of the Malenkov 
government.177 None of the newspapers considered this note as a step for the 
improvement of Turco-Soviet relations, except for Akşam which informed the 
news with optimistic headlines.178 On the other hand, other newspapers were 
insistent on maintaining their mistrust for the Soviet Union, as the Menderes 
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Government did. Dünya divided its banner headline into two pieces on June 11, 
1953; on the left side the Soviet verbal note was informed, and on the right side 
there was a photograph showing the tears of a woman from East Germany.179 This 
might be regarded as a meaningful act to remind the readers of Dünya about the 
perspective of the newspaper. The next day, F. R. Atay commented on the note 
with a careful diplomatic language, claiming that Turkey should not leave NATO 
in order not to hurt the Western countries.180 Moreover, Ulus, Vatan, and Zafer 
were relatively indifferent to the (uncertain) peace efforts of the Soviet Union. In 
general, the articles of Yalman and Yalçın included common claims such as the 
“peace-loving” Turkey was innocent during the 1945 Crisis, therefore Turkey 
should not have shifted its place.181 Mümtaz Faik Fenik wrote only one article 
about the Soviet note, in which he insisted on his doubts about the Soviet regime 
and accused Moscow Radio for having used a “profane language” for Turkey.182  
The pessimism about the Soviet attempt was not surprising, because the 
Turkish press had never left the agitated atmosphere since 1945. It is reasonable to 
consider that Stalin’s death might have remained insufficient to end all misgivings 
about the Soviet Union. However, the newspapers were still eager to foment 
speculations. For instance, it was quite possible to find several speculative issues 
about the so-called ‘World War plans’ of the Soviet Union, just after the 
declaration of the USSR that they had produced the first hydrogen bomb.183  
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On the other hand, the press was extremely optimistic for the support of 
the United States. Vatan once claimed that NATO would give atomic bomb to 
Turkey, if war outbreaks.184 At the same time, the Menderes government 
continued its anti-communist policies. Zafer carried the banner of the anti-
communism, while M.F. Fenik intended to label all oppositional groups in a 
single front. 
 
Communism has been uprooted in our country. Turkey is the 
homeland of the real patriots. 
 
It could be observed that the purposes of all (foes), either leftist or 
rightist, are the same: to damage social order and to create turmoil! 
For this reason, we have to imply the necessary legal measures 
urgently.185   
 
 
Mümtaz Faik Fenik would soon direct his sharp pen to NP with a bitter 
language.186 However, the final propaganda campaign against NP would be 
launched in October, when NP began to be tried after the accusations of 
threatening the country’s regime. This time, both Fenik and Yalman implied that 
the Islamists were in collaboration with the communists.187 It is quite possible that 
the new propaganda campaign was directed by DP, because these allegations were 
not supported by the pro-RPP press and independent newspapers. As a matter of 
fact, Vatan and Zafer did not continue their claims about a partnership between 
the fundamentalists in Turkey and the Soviet Union after the closure of NP at the 
end of January 1954. 
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Soviet note on May 30 was replied in July 18, 1953. Turkey’s attitude was 
deliberate, because it was too early to predict the real tendency behind the Soviet 
act. Moreover, Turkey was still receiving aid from the West.188 The atmosphere of 
the newspapers was naturally reflected the ongoing mistrust of the government. 
When the Soviet government sent a new note, the press did not show a joint 
reaction. Instead, the reaction was limited and mostly expressed by Yalman, 
Yalçın, and Fenik. Before the reply of Turkey on July 18, Yalman had previously 
warned the government not to leave the Western alliance.189 However, he 
remained silent after the Soviet note on 20 July, protesting the visit of a NATO 
fleet to İstanbul. On the other hand, Fenik had a furious reaction, naming the last 
verbal note as “weird.”190 Three days later, he published a more severe article, 
blaming the Soviet Union to push Turkey into a “war of nerves,” and added that 
“Turkey’s nerves were as strong as its peace-loving sentiment”.191 Like Zafer, 
Ulus also criticized the second note, ignoring the cold reply of Turkey to the first 
note of the Soviet Union. Nihat Erim (1906-1980) stated that Turkey’s reply was 
proper, as the visit of the NATO fleet did not violate the provisions of the 
Montreaux Convention.192 
Among all Turkish newspapers, Dünya and Akşam had greater emphasis 
on the foreign affairs and the Cold War issues, while the others mostly focused on 
the foreign policy of the Soviet Union in terms of its relations with Turkey. Dünya 
had previously published news about the power struggle between Beria and 
Malenkov, while Akşam was the only newspaper, which brought the July 1953 
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unrest in East Berlin to its headlines.193 Other newspapers generally published 
ordinary news about the Soviet Union and the struggle against the communists in 
Turkey.  
The uncertainty about the Soviet Union after Stalin during the summer of 
1953, revealed one of the greatest problems of the Turkish press. Turkish 
newspapers were deprived of reliable sources of information directly associated 
with the Soviet Union, which could be regarded as an alternative for the news 
received from TASS. Therefore they were dependent on the Western press and 
continuously published western oriented news, including the most speculative 
ones. The most eminent example was the sarcastic rumors about Lavrenti Beria. 
After Pravda declared the arrest of Lavrenti Beria, only Dünya informed Beria’s 
fall and rumors concerning him in its headlines.194 Moreover, Beria’s fall did not 
seem to create optimism for many editors. Fenik asserted that his mistrust had 
been intensified after the uncertainty in the Soviet leadership.195 Altemur Kılıç 
(1924- ), the young foreign policy columnist of Vatan even claimed that Beria’s 
elimination also referred to the elimination of the Soviet regime.196 However, 
Zafer and Vatan published the speculative rumors about the veteran Soviet 
hangman that he had fled to Latin America and was ready to confess all military 
secrets of the USSR, two months after the arrest of Beria.197 This contradictory 
rumor occupied a vast place in both newspapers. On the other hand, neither Zafer 
nor Vatan had such a great intention, when the facts about Beria were revealed. 
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Beria’s execution occupied only a few lines in Zafer, at the end of the 
December.198  
 As it has been mentioned, Turkish press was reluctant to discuss 
Malenkov’s first step to renounce the former territorial claims. Malenkov’s second 
step was to underline the intention of the USSR to improve relations with Turkey, 
during one of his speeches in the Supreme Soviet. Although the text of the speech 
was published in Pravda199 on August 8, 1953, the Turkish press seemed 
disinterested. Ulus and Vatan brought the speech into their headlines,200 but 
neither Yalçın nor Yalman appreciated Malenkov’s attitude, as it was usual. Zafer 
was completely silent about the new move of the Soviet Union. It could be 
interpreted that the Menderes government preferred to avoid expressing its view. 
Otherwise, Zafer would have reflected the stance of the government. The unique 
solid reaction was the relatively warm article of Atay published on August 10. 
Atay’s rhetoric was calm in comparison to others, but the author was still far from 
believing the cordiality of the Soviet moves. Instead, Atay once more repeated the 
classical perspective that he shared with Yalçın, Yalman, Fenik, and others. 
According to him, in 1945, the peace was endangered not by Turkey, but by the 
Soviet Union, which was also responsible for the bloodshed in Asia and Central 
Europe.201 Erkilet also regarded the new Soviet move as a trap.202 Yalçın 
contributed Atay’s ideas, writing a late comment over Malenkov’s speech. In his 
editorial article on August 14, Yalçın claimed that the only purpose of Turkey was 
                                               
198
 “Beria ve 6 Arkadaşı İdam Edildiler” Zafer, 25 December 1953. 
199
 Tellal, Uluslararası ve Bölgesel…, p.74 
200
 “Malenkov’un Barış Teklifi” Ulus, 9 August 1953; “Malenkov Yeni Bir Sulh Taarruzuna 
Girişti” Vatan, 9 August 1953. 
201
 Falih Rıfkı Atay, “Malenkof’un Nutku Üzerine” Dünya, 10 August 1953. 
202
 H. Emir Erkilet, “Rus Ağına Düşmiyeceğiz” Milliyet, 12 August 1953.  
 57
to maintain peace, and Turkey never had demands from the Soviet Union.203 
Yalçın supplemented his ideas in another article and asserted his personal view for 
the impossibility for a détente between the two superpowers.204 
 Despite the relative relaxation in the press, the routine anti-Soviet attitude 
and mistrusts still continued. The Turkish press was ultimately biased to regard 
Senator Joseph McCarthy only as a ‘popular personality’ in the United States.205 
On the other hand, the reactions against the execution of Rosenbergs in the 
Western public opinion were not published in the Turkish newspapers, both the 
RPP front and the DP front continued their attacks, either directly or indirectly.  
The efforts for rapprochement by Malenkov could not provide a change in 
the attitude of the Turkish press.206 Up to September 1953, pro-DP front was one 
step ahead. Zafer simultaneously carried two different propaganda campaigns, 
both of which it was contributed by Vatan. In one of these campaigns, the 
“weaknesses of the Soviet Union” was exposed. Both newspapers denied the 
progress in the Soviet military power, even after the declaration of the Soviet 
Union, that they had produced the hydrogen bomb. This did not create an 
immense panic, but pessimism to some extent. The news was placed in Vatan’s 
headlines207 but Yalman did not have any comment about the issue. On the other 
hand, Fenik had already asserted that the hydrogen bomb could not be more 
powerful than the atomic bomb.208 Moreover, Zafer conveyed a series of anti-
Soviet articles from the foreign press, following the declaration of the hydrogen 
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bomb.209 One of those anti-Soviet articles was unusually placed in the weekend 
magazine supplement.210 The second joint campaign of Vatan and Zafer was to 
attack NP as being alleged to center of the “Moscow sponsored Islamists.”Yalman 
was the greatest champion of these claims.211 
 Anti-Soviet headlines were also common in the independent newspapers. 
Akşam was an exception, which published a calm headline on July 20, 1953, 
emphasizing on the peace efforts of the Malenkov regime.212 However, Akşam 
also had to return to an aggressive language just one day later, due to the Soviet 
note about the Istanbul visit of the NATO fleet. One week later, Akşam chose a 
speculative headline and claimed that a coup d’etat was being expected in the 
Soviet Presidium, although this was only a speculation born in the American 
political circles.213 Around September, Cumhuriyet and Vatan accentuated the 
agricultural crisis in the Soviet Union.214 Cumhuriyet’s attitude was tranquil in 
comparison to Vatan and the other independent newspapers. At least Nadir Nadi 
stopped to focus on the Soviet antagonism in his editorials. Still, Cumhuriyet 
maintained its anti-communist stance. For instance, it reported the “traitor” 
Zekeriya Sertel had attended to a communist congress in Budapest.215 
  The two anti-Soviet authors of Milliyet, Erkilet and Mirza Bala continued 
to express their hopes for the collapse of the Soviet Union periodically. Mirza 
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Bala even chose speculative titles for some of his articles even though making 
substantial references for his claims.216 
  
 
4.3. The Passive Anti-Sovietism (October 1953 – August 1955):  
 
No serious political crisis was witnessed in the Turco – Soviet relations 
until 1957. However, the negative anti-Soviet legacy of the near past prevented 
the relaxation of the Turkish press for a long time. Until 1955, the newspapers 
continued to publish anti-Soviet content, but in a decreased level. Another reason 
for the decrease in the extent of anti-Soviet content in the press was the increased 
tension in domestic politics.  
 
 
4.3.1. Nationalist Reaction against the Soviet Union: 
 
One of the notable points of anti-Soviet sentiment in the Turkish press was 
its deficiency of a common ideology behind it. The Crisis of the Straits did not 
emerge as a result of an ideological clash, but as an incident relevant to 
realpolitik. Anti-Soviet nationalism before 1945 referred to the Pan-Turkist circle 
of Hüseyin Nihal Atsız. As it has been mentioned, the ideas of Pan-Turkists 
contrasted with the nationalism of the Kemalist republic, especially in terms of the 
relations with the Soviet Union. The sudden rise of Russian antagonism enabled 
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former Pan-Turkists to utter their comments easier in this anti-Soviet context. 
Apart from Pan-Turkists, many dissident writers such as Mirza Bala and Mehmet 
Emin Resulzâde returned to Turkey. Until 1954, Mirza Bala contributed 
nationalist criticism to the Soviet Union, publishing several articles about the 
history of the national movement of Azerbaijan and Soviet oppression over the 
Azerbaijani people.217 However, he was alone, because the main concern of the 
Turkish press then was Turkey’s security. On the other hand, this time nationalists 
(either former Pan-Turkish circles, or émigré writers) were not subjected to severe 
criticism from the Republican and Democratic press organs. Instead, Atay once 
warned the government not to regard Turkish nationalists on the Soviet side, as 
they were essentially anti-leftist and anti-Soviet. The veteran RPP journalist 
seemed to forget governmental persecution of his party over Pan-Turkists just 
before a decade, not to mention his fierce articles against the Pan-Turkists” back 
in 1944.218  
Nonetheless it was still possible to see some articles and news in 
Cumhuriyet about the Russian persecution of Turkistani leaders, Uyghurs’ 
struggle against the Communist Chinese, or the Soviet pressure to control Muslim 
rituals.219 The prominent Pan-Turkist writer Reha Oğuz Türkkan also wrote 
several articles in Cumhuriyet. However, Türkkan only narrated notes from his 
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own experiences in America, usually mentioning the superiority of the United 
States in the Cold War.220 It is somewhat surprising to see the indifference of 
Zafer and Vatan to the issue. Neither Fenik nor Yalman condemned Soviet rule 
over Turkic–Muslim peoples. Only once, Vatan’s headlines informed the 
execution of the ‘three Turks’221 who were accused of espionage for Turkey. The 
rest of the news was merely consisted of articles and feuilletons. These texts did 
not seem to aim at attracting the intention of the public opinion to the nationalist 
cause, as the prevalent examples were written in the style of fictional adventure 
series.222  
 Until the end of 1954, Mirza Bala mostly wrote about the failures of the 
Soviet policies,223 labor exploitation in the Soviet Union and its satellites,224 
gloomy life conditions,225 and the implications of the Soviet imperialism, 
inherited by the Tsarist regime.226 Interestingly, some of his articles were identical 
with the later perspectives of the Cold War Turkish historiography, including the 
statements about the historical aspirations of the Russian Empire over the Straits 
and the historical role of Turks in the construction of Russian national identity.227 
However, Mirza Bala and Erkilet terminated their articles in Milliyet after May 
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1954. At the end of the year, there were some structural changes in Milliyet. The 
newspaper adopted the popular style of Hürriyet, in which tabloid news had a 
priority over the political context. After 1954, there was not a permanent anti-
Soviet figure among the Milliyet writers, and the rhetoric of the newspaper was 
tempered about the Soviet Union. Moreover, active nationalist journalists of the 
time, such as Reha Oğuz Türkkan, Peyami Safa, and Orhan Seyfi Orhon did not 
publish articles to criticize the Soviet treatment of the Turkic and Muslim peoples 
of the USSR.  
 Turkish nationalists would become one of the main centers of the Soviet 
antagonism in Turkey up to 1970s. The common feature of the Soviet Union and 
China, two empires possessed the lands of Turkestan, was communism. However, 
the writers with Pan-Turkist tendencies (or simply Turkic nationalists) were not 
numerous in 1950s. On the other hand, neither Pan-Turkists nor Turkic – Muslim 
nationalists were not regarded as the premier internal threat (as the former faced 
with persecutions in 1940s and latter in 1930s) under the heavy influence of the 
anti-Soviet Zeitgeist of the time. Moreover, pro-Americanism could be adopted by 
some former Pan-Turkists as the sole antidote for the confrontation of the Soviet 
Union, as it could be observed in Erkilet’s articles.228  
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4.3.2. Continuation of the Routine Anti-Sovietism until 1955: 
 
As it has been mentioned, the extent of anti-Sovietism had a minor 
decrease after Stalin’s death, but the attitude of the certain anti-Soviet figures 
were still the same. Ulus and Zafer particularly sustained their harsh anti-Soviet 
statements, although the domestic competition between RPP and DP suddenly 
increased before six months before the parliamentary elections in 1954. 
Political struggle between RPP and DP had continued since 1946, but the 
ongoing clash between the parties became more rigorous after the year 1953. In 
December, the government confiscated all properties of RPP, including central 
building of the party.229 The name of Ulus had to be changed to Yeni Ulus (The 
New Nation) in December 1953. This extreme measure against the opposition 
triggered a harsh quarrel between Yeni Ulus and Dünya versus Zafer. The 
weirdest detail of the quarrel was the continuation of anti-Soviet articles and 
usage of anti-Soviet elements even in the tensest day of the clash.  
Before the quarrel between RPP and DP, Falih Rıfkı Atay was among the 
supporters of the government’s allegations about the “collaboration between 
Islamists and communists”. Although Atay previously expressed his optimism 
about NP leader Hikmet Bayur’s loyalty to the laïc regime of the country in his 
previous articles, 230 he later joined Yalman’s front and accused NP of 
collaboration with the Soviet spies. Atay claimed that the Soviet Union trained 
two kinds of spies: “The first type spies, who would infiltrate into the Western 
countries, were trained in the Warsaw University. The second type spies were 
trained in Tashkent University and sent to the Muslim countries to foment 
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communist propaganda with Islamic values,” in reference to Tudeh Party in Iran, 
and Nation Party in Turkey. Atay’s unexpected accusation of NP could be 
interpreted in reference to the ongoing closure trial of the party. Thus, RPP could 
monopolize the opposition against DP in the elections.  
In December 1953, the Turkish parliament witnessed a turbulent period of 
quarrels, after DP’s disreputable decision to expropriate RPP property. Before the 
decision, the quarrel had been already brought to the press, including anti-Russian 
statements. In his editorial article on December 10, 1953, Falih Rıfkı Atay 
attacked DP minister Samet Ağaoğlu “as the grandson of a Tsarist officer.”231 
While Ulus was about to be seized, after being confiscated as a RPP property, 
Hüseyin Cahit Yalçın initially expressed his fury to this move,232 but he 
interestingly concentrated on anti-Sovietism during the hardest days of his 
newspaper, beside his anti-Menderes articles. Yalçın’s rhetoric in this period was 
extreme as it was in 1945. On January 21, 1954, he stated: 
 
However, Bolsheviks ever so much blemished the concept of 
ethics with mud, as we still witness the frustrating parades. For 
instance, a letter published in the Literary Newspaper 
[Literaturnaya Gazeta] about the “cleansing” of Beria and his 
friends, brightly enlightens the current situation of the 
Muscovite characteristics.233 
  
 
Apart from criticizing the Bolsheviks’ way to eliminate Beria, his attitude 
was quite incoherent in this paragraph. It was unclear whether he differentiated 
the Russians and Bolsheviks or not. Moreover, Yalçın continued to warn the 
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country about the “approaching” danger of the bolshevism, urging government 
not to damage the friendship with the United States.234  
Both (Yeni) Ulus and Zafer published many articles about the Soviet 
danger, despite the approaching parliamentary elections on May 2, 1954. The 
parties still had a consensus in their foreign policy perspectives, but Yalçın began 
to criticize the failures of the Menderes government in foreign policy, notably 
after a political scandal in Cairo.235 However, the tacit agreement between the 
parties in terms of anti-Sovietism still continued. Ahmet Şükrü Esmer called DP 
to avoid discrimination in favor of partisanship, at least in foreign policy, in order 
to secure Turkey’s place in the international arena.236 On the opposite side, Zafer 
furiously attacked RPP and (Yeni) Ulus until the election, but continued to 
manipulate anti-Soviet sentiment. For instance, it claimed that the Russians were 
terrified after the construction of the Esenboğa Airport in Ankara.237  
 Following the landslide victory of DP in the elections in 1954, the 
oppression over the RPP organ rose. Yeni Ulus had to change its name to Halkçı 
(Populist). Although Halkçı and its editor Yalçın had the harder times, the 
newspaper still supported the government in its foreign policy. On May 6, Yalçın 
targeted an article in Pravda, which assessed the results of the Turkish 
parliamentary elections, and claimed the Soviet Union aimed at intervening 
Turkey’s the domestic affairs.238 On September 23, 1954, Halkçı informed its 
readers about the arrestment of their editor at the age of 79. The veteran journalist 
Yalçın was subjected to the same situation with the Sertel couple, after a decade. 
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Until his release, Yalçın wrote some articles from his prison cell, but he still 
continued his anti-Soviet stance, and made warnings about the communist 
activities in the Middle East.239   
 On the opposite side, Zafer writers also aimed at labeling the rivals of DP 
as the supporters of the Soviet Union. In an article, Mümtaz Faik Fenik insulted 
the journalist Nurettin Ardıçoğlu due to an article, which criticized the 
insufficiency of the American aid. Ardıçoğlu was also one of the founders of the 
Republican Nation Party (RNP), successor of the Nation Party. Fenik claimed that 
the ideas like the ones in Ardıçoğlu’s article could be published only on 
Pravda.240 A few months later, Fenik also accused Ulus of treachery. According 
to the editor of Zafer, Ulus had served Russians, publishing misinformation about 
the municipality elections, which was previously protested by RPP.241 The 
noteworthy point here was the common characteristics of the accusations by pro-
RPP and pro-DP journalists. From Atay to Fenik, all of them accused the 
particular figures from the opposite side of pro-Russianism. Although, the 
accusations also seemed directly related with communism in a synonymous 
fashion, it should be noted that the pejorative elements in the rhetoric of the 
correspondents were pre-dominantly connected with pro-Russianism.  
Apart from accusing the members of RPP and NP of collaborating with the 
Soviet Union, Zafer also continued its severe anti-Soviet stance, jointly with 
Vatan. Mümtaz Faik Fenik and the foreign policy columnist Mücahit Topalak 
continuously repeated warnings about the Soviet threat.242 
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During 1954, Vatan also insisted on the pretensiousness of Malenkov’s 
peace efforts.243 In addition, both newspapers continued to publish anti-Soviet 
news and feuilletons both about the Soviet Union and its satellites behind the Iron 
Curtain.244 These two newspapers were also supplemented by the independent 
newspapers, which still supported the foreign policy of the government. As an 
exception, Akşam’s stance was more optimistic in the first headline of 1954,245 but 
this did not necessarily mean that Akşam’s optimism was permanent. Until the end 
of 1955, the majority of the news and articles in the newspaper reflected a pro-
American stance like the other newspapers.246 The stance of Akşam also indicates 
that the pro-Soviet sentiment might have also been regarded as a commercial 
asset. For instance, Akşam published a half-fictional serial feuilleton about the 
activities of the Soviet spies, during 250 days.247  
Although Turkey and the Soviet Union continued the skirmish of the 
verbal notes during 1954 and 1955,248 the relations were relatively stable during 
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Malenkov’s administration. The unexpected resignation (or ouster) of 
Malenkov249 opened the way of new speculations, and contributed the mistrust 
among the Turkish journalists. As a matter of fact, the attitude of the Turkish 
press was reasonable. Malenkov’s fall might have referred to a sign for the 
reaction of the Soviet leadership against the attempts for détente. Moreover, 
Malenkov’s declaration of his own failure after his forced resignation made 
several correspondents to think the possibility of a struggle between the Soviet 
leaders, which could open the way for instability. In fact, Malenkov’s foreign 
policy was more desirable in comparison to the rigid foreign policy Stalin, which 
had not satisfied the members of the Politburo.250 On the other hand, the domestic 
policy originated conflict between Malenkov and Khrushchev was reflected to the 
foreign policy. For instance, the Khrushchev faction forced Malenkov to renounce 
his famous speech on March 14, 1954, in which Soviet premier stated that the 
nuclear war “would be a new holocaust for the world.”251 Under these 
circumstances, it was reasonable for Turkish press to sustain their misgivings. 
Actually, the resignation of Malenkov did not cause a panic, but many journalists 
stated their anxiety about a shift in the Soviet policy towards Stalinism.252  
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4.3.3. Assessment of the non-Soviet Communists and Leftist Movements: 
 
One of essential questions about the negative Soviet image in Turkey was 
the extent of the correlation between the anti-Russian (or anti-Soviet) and anti-
communist sentiments. It is almost impossible to assess the entire Turkish press 
monolithically, because the perspectives were quite different even between the 
two journalists in a newspaper.  
 It is possible to claim that the anti-Sovietism and the anti-communism 
were amalgamated from the beginning of 1940s until the second half of 1950s. 
The main reason for this was the uniqueness of the Soviet Union as a great 
communist power, and its universal leadership in the communist movement. 
However, the schism between the Soviet Union and other leftist fractions (mainly 
European socialist parties) became apparent also for Turkish correspondents in 
1950s. In addition, Turkish press began to perceive the differences of the USSR 
from the other communist regimes, especially after the deterioration of the Soviet 
Union’s relations with Yugoslavia and the People’s Republic of China.  
The attitude of the Turkish press also depended on the foreign relations of 
the government. An eminent example was the praises for Tito, during a long time 
following the official visit of the Yugoslav Premier to Ankara.253 Most of them 
were naturally published in Zafer in order to justify the diplomatic strategy of 
Adnan Menderes.254 As a notable detail, Mümtaz Faik Fenik never used the word 
“communism” for Tito and Yugoslavia in his editorial,255 because the official 
press organ of DP still continued depicting a “demonic” image for communism. 
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Vatan, which still supported DP independently, was at first reluctant to 
praise Tito, but Ahmet Emin Yalman soon published editorials praising Tito.256 As 
an ardent supporter of the American regime, Yalman’s animosity was mainly 
directed against communism instead of Soviet Russia. Along with Altemur Kılıç, 
he never hesitated to criticize the ruling communist parties in the NATO members 
and their rapprochements with the Soviet Union.257 Following the Moscow’s 
rapprochement with Belgrad, Vatan began to attack Tito, accusing Yugoslavia of 
collaborating with the Soviet Union for the revival of the Pan-Slavist 
aspirations.258 
After 1953, the perspectives of the newspapers about the authoritarian and 
totalitarian regimes, either communist or not, differed. However, the relations of 
the Soviet Union also shaped the views of the Turkish correspondents. For 
instance, it was possible to observe contrasting accounts about the leaders of the 
Third World, such as Mohammed Mossaddeq, Gamal Abdel Nasser, and 
Jawaharlal Nehru. For instance, democratically elected Iranian Prime Minister, 
Mosaddeq was mostly labeled as a dictator, although the Shah Mohammed Reza 
Pahlavi was never depicted as such in the Turkish press. Mosaddeq’s close 
relations with the Tudeh Party and his confrontation of the Western countries 
must have convinced the Turkish press to assess Mossaddeq as a pro-Soviet 
figure.259 In contrast to Mosaddeq, Nasser was praised in the Turkish newspapers 
until 1956, especially in Zafer and Vatan, with regard to the initial expectations of 
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Menderes from him.260 
 Although the pro-RPP journalists drew an early attention to anti-Turk 
speeches of Nasser,261 Zafer waited until the revelation of Nasser’s stance after the 
Suez Crisis. Egypt would eventually be one of the main targets of the Turkish 
newspapers after the intense Soviet support to this country and the protagonist 
role of Nasser in the tensions between Turkey and Syria.   
There were no diplomatic relations between Turkey and the Communist 
China in 1950s. Therefore, the newspapers were totally free to attack China, but 
the assessments about the Mao regime was rarely seen in the press.262  
One of the most noteworthy contrasts about the Turkish press of 1950s 
was the existence of several leftist correspondents in the newspapers, despite the 
ultimate anti-communist atmosphere. Many novels of the socialist authors such as 
Kemal Tahir, Orhan Kemal, and Yaşar Kemal were published as feuilletons in 
several newspapers.263 Only between 1953 and 1956, during the most dominant 
period of anti-Sovietism in the Turkish press, it was possible to see the articles of 
the leftist intellectuals in various newspapers. The notable examples were the 
painter and poet Bedri Rahmi Eyüboğlu and jurist Tarık Zafer Tunaya in 
Cumhuriyet; painter Fikret Otyam in Dünya; sociologist and historian Niyazi 
Berkes in Vatan. Until 1960, it was rare but possible to see the newspapers 
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employing leftist journalists among their permanent staff such as Aziz Nesin (in 
Akşam after 1958) and Çetin Altan (in Milliyet after 1959). In addition, several 
stories translated by Hasan Ali Ediz were seen in the inner pages of Cumhuriyet 
after in 1957.  
No radical changes in the attitude of the Turkish press towards the leftist 
ideologies were observed until 1960s. However, some journalists began to 
evaluate European socialism separately from the Soviet communism. On March 
13, 1955, Nadir Nadi’s complained about the confusion of communism and 
socialism in Turkey, distinguishing European socialism from the “evil” 
communism of Moscow.264 His ideas were later supported by Şükrü Kaya.265 On 
the contrary, the governmental newspapers still insisted assessing the Soviet 
Union and the European leftist parties as a single whole.266  
 
 
4.4. The Silence before the Storm: Brief Serenity on the eve of the 
Hungarian Uprising (September 1955 – December 1956): 
 
Under the influence of the relaxation of the Turco-Soviet relations 
between 1953 and 1955, there were changes in the general atmosphere of the 
Turkish press in terms of Soviet antagonism. The period between the fall 1955 
and the end of 1956 witnessed the cohabitation of the different perspectives in the 
Turkish daily newspapers. However, the relaxation of anti-Sovietism temporarily 
lost its pace after two notable incidents: The pogrom against the non-Muslim 
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minority in İstanbul on September 6 and 7, 1955, and the shock of the Hungarian 
Uprising in 1956. 
 
 
4.4.1. From the Istanbul Pogrom until the Hungarian Uprising: 
 
The famous incident, which sparkled on September 6 and lasted until 
September 7, 1955 was called “The Incident of 6–7 September” in Turkish, 
Σεpiτεµβριανά (The September Events) in Greek, and Istanbul pogrom in English  
accounts. The pogrom was generally evaluated in the context of Greco-Turkish 
relations, with regard to the beginning of the Cyprus Question. However, the 
events also had implications over the anti-Soviet sentiment in the Turkish press, 
not only in terms of anti-communism but also anti-Sovietism, after the 
government explicitly alleged communists in Turkey as the conspiratiors.  
Prior to the incident, Zafer had published a press conference of Menderes 
on June 8, 1955, as the semi-official DP organ usually did. During the interview, 
the Prime Minister was asked by a correspondent whether there was a “fifth 
column” of the communists in Turkey. Menderes denied any kind of communist 
movement in Turkey with a decisive language, stating that “it was impossible to 
adapt communism to Turkish mentality. As the Turkish people became aware of 
the communist spies, knowing that communism was a tool of the Soviet 
imperialism, they appreciated the legal measures taken by the government.”267 
This was the last example of the speeches, in which Menderes defined Turkey as a 
staunch castle against communism.  
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 The Istanbul pogrom was sparkled after the appearance of a speculative 
but provacative banner in the second edition of an evening newspaper published 
in Istanbul.268 Before the suppression of the riot, the evening newspapers on 
September 7, and the morning newspapers on September 8, attacked communists 
as who was responsible for the “undesired” events, in reference to the official 
declaration of the government on the second day of the riot, including Dünya.269  
Ulus condemned the incident but the journalists of Ulus (even Yalçın) did 
not name the conspirators as “communist.” Moreover, the governmental 
declaration published in Ulus did not include the allegations for communists.270 In 
addition, this time Vatan and Cumhuriyet did not publish the governmental 
declaration and therefore did not target communists in the first days.271 
At first, the incident was not related to the Soviet Union in the Turkish 
press. At least, there was not such news in Zafer or other newspapers, which 
supported the government. However, a few months after the incident, Ahmet 
Emin Yalman published an article, which directly accused the Soviet Union as the 
power behind the riot. In this article, Yalman assessed the indictment of the 
martial law court, which had been ad hoc established after the incident. The 
mentioned indictment targeted various people and groups from the socialist ELAS 
forces in the Greek Civil War to Nâzım Hikmet Ran, who was insulted by Yalman 
as “the most vulgar of the traitors.” 272 This was one of the last times that Yalman 
                                               
268
 “Atamızın Evi Bomba ile Hasara Uğradı” İstanbul Ekspres, 2nd Edition, 6 September 1955. 
269
 “Bu Sabah Neşredilen Hükûmet Tebliği: Komünist Tertip ve Tahrikine Maruz Kaldık” İstanbul 
Ekspres, 7 September 1955; “Memleket Ağır Bir Komünist Tertip ve Tahribine Maruz Kaldı” 
Akşam, 7 September 1955; “Nümayiş Gecesi Tahrikât Yapan Otuzdan Fazla Komünist Yakalandı” 
Hürriyet, 8 September 1955; “Hükümetin Tedbirleri” Zafer, 8 September 1955; “33 Komünist 
Tahrikçi Yakalandı: İstanbul ve İzmirdeki Müessif Hâdiseleri Kızıl Sabotörlerin Yarattığı 
Anlaşıldı” Dünya, 9 September 1955. 
270
 “Hükümetin Son Tebliği” Ulus, 2nd Edition, 7 September 1955. 
271
 “Selânikteki Menfur Tecavüz” Cumhuriyet, 7 September 1955; “Selânik’te Ata’mızın Evi ile 
Konsolosluğa Bomba Atıldı” Vatan, 7 September 1955. 
272
 Ahmet Emin Yalman, “Asıl Suçlu Moskova” Vatan, 13 February 1956.  
 75
explicitly supported the claims of the government. After 1956, the relations 
between Vatan and the Menderes government drastically soured.  
Except for Yalman’s aggressive article, the press generally did not attack 
communists after a while. This was an important sign of relaxation in the anti-
Soviet sentiment in the Turkish press, depending on the low tension in the 
relations with the Soviet Union. The routine anti-Soviet and synonymously anti-
communist stance had continued before the Istanbul Pogrom and did not vane 
immediately. On the other hand, this time press was divided into two groups. The 
permanently anti-Soviet journalists such as Yalman and Yalçın were insistent on 
the Soviet threat, but the ideas of many journalists, including Şükrü Kaya were 
somewhat relaxed. Kaya seemed convinced by the peace guarantees given by the 
Soviet Union.273  
 
 
4.4.2. Fruitless Tears for the Budapest Martyrs: 
  
 The temporary relaxation of anti-Sovietism had a halt at the end of 1956 
with the Hungarian Uprising, after which the world public witnessed the merciless 
response of the Soviet Union towards the political deviation in its satellites. The 
Soviet invasion of Hungary naturally influenced the prevalent anti-Soviet authors 
in the Turkish press.   In comparison to the year 1953, contrasting attitudes could 
be observed in the Turkish press in its perspective towards the Soviet Union, 
especially in the independent newspapers, such as Dünya.274 Until the Hungarian 
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Uprising, it was possible to observe exceptional articles by Falih Rıfkı Atay. For 
instance, he once claimed that should be open to trade with the Soviet Union.275 
However, the harsh Soviet criticism continued in Dünya.276 In addition, Ulus also 
stopped to support the government in its struggle against communism, although 
the newspaper was stagnant in its anti-Soviet stance, in comparison to Dünya.277  
 At the beginning of 1956, permanently anti-Soviet Yalman and Yalçın 
stated that their expectations in the New Year were quite low in terms of world 
peace. According to them, the only way for peace was the withdrawal of the 
Soviet Union, from its satellites.278 On the other hand, the other newspapers did 
not emphasize the Turco-Soviet relations in their New Year comments, as they 
continuously did during the previous decade. However, this did not mean a 
complete relaxation in their attitudes, because they were still dismal after the 
drastic 20th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU). 
Unexpected decisions after the 20th Congress of the CPSU (14 – 25 
February 1956) included the restabilization of the foreign relations especially with 
Yugoslavia and Turkey, among various implications of the de-Stalinization.279 On 
the other hand, de-Stalinization was not considered seriously in Turkish 
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newspapers. The congress was not evaluated in the newspapers separately from 
the routine events in the foreign countries. On the eve of the congress, Dünya and 
Akşam drew attention to the new positive diplomatic moves of the Soviet 
government in reference to Pravda, while the other newspapers, especially the 
primary organs of RPP and DP were seemed quite disinterested to the future of 
Moscow.280  
Dünya and Vatan maintained their misgivings after the congress.281 Zafer’s 
attention to the congress was also limited. The foreign policy correspondent of the 
newspaper of the government mentioned the decision of de-Stalinization only 
once and did not consider it as a serious move.282  
Zafer was also silent about the news published in the neutral newspapers, 
related to the rapprochement with the Soviet Union. Following the congress, the 
diplomatic moves from the Soviet Union increased. Dünya and Cumhuriyet and 
even Ulus informed their readers about the Soviet offers for financial aid and the 
official invitation of the Prime Minister with a warm language.283  
It could be observed that the Turkish press could have sudden changes, 
when the issue of financial aid for Turkey was mentioned. After the news about 
the Russian offer, even Yalçın temporarily seemed among the supporters of the 
rapprochement, denying the animosity for Russia in Turkey.284 The only 
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exception was Yalman, who explicitly reflected his fury for the Soviet moves. The 
main reason behind Yalman’s stance must have been his reliance for the United 
States, both in terms of financial aid and protecting Turkey from the external 
threats. Yalman stressed the importance of the American aid several times.285 
However, his perspective should be considered separately from the government, 
as the relations between Yalman and the Menderes government began to 
deteriorate.286   
 The Menderes government did not seem impetuous after the Soviet moves. 
Therefore, the newspapers did not maintain their optimism about the shifts in the 
Soviet foreign policy, especially in terms of the hopes of change after the 20th 
Congress. The Soviet Russia was still regarded as the descendant of the “cruel 
Tsars” by the Turkish correspondents. 287 
Despite ongoing antagonism towards Russia, the reaction of the Turkish 
press varied in different newspapers after the Hungarian Revolt. Some 
newspapers, especially Vatan and Cumhuriyet explicitly supported Poles and 
Hungarians after 22 October 1956. These two newspapers observed the events 
carefully and informed their readers with fiery headlines, which ardently 
supported the revolutionaries.288 Yalman did not mention the disasters in Hungary 
except one editorial article, in which he expressed his hope for the destruction of 
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the Iron Curtain.289 In addition, Vatan’s attention was shifted to the Suez Crisis, 
which emerged a few days after the Hungarian Uprising, but Cumhuriyet 
continued to publish the daily progress of the revolutionaries in Hungary. 
However, Nadir Nadi did not write one single article for the revolutionaries. 
In a sense, the press supported the Hungarians with agitated headlines.290 
However, none of the newspapers were as furious against the USSR as in 1953. 
Moreover, none of the editors had a special emphasis over the Soviet invasion. 
For instance, Dünya reported the revolt day by day, while Atay did not publish 
any article about the “Soviet cruelty” which was previously condemned by him 
several times. The stance of Ulus was also noteworthy. The RPP newspaper did 
not neglect the Hungarian Uprising, but the reaction of Hüseyin Cahit Yalçın only 
directed to the “hypocrisy” of the Soviet Union in its relations with Turkey.291 The 
inhuman Soviet treatment in Hungary was only once assessed by Yalçın.292 
Soviet suppression of the Hungarian revolt was also protested by Şükrü 
Kaya in Hürriyet. The veteran minister of Atatürk also protested the Soviet Union, 
although he previously claimed the possibility to establish stable relations with 
Moscow. The difference of Şükrü Kaya’s reaction from the other correspondents 
was his rational assessment of the Soviet reaction. He mentioned that “it was even 
possible to observe a reversal in the Soviet attitude towards humanitarianism, 
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because the Soviet Union would lose their possessions, unless it relaxes its 
oppression over the satellites and stop persecutions.293 
 Apart from its political dimension, some newspapers also included 
interesting allegations about the ongoing skirmish. A notable one was the 
allegations about the murder of the famous Hungarian football player Ferenc 
Puskás.294 Moreover, the pro-DP front was more silent than the pro-RPP 
newspapers and the independent press. It could be claimed that Zafer had 
neglected the issue. In comparison to Cumhuriyet and Vatan, the most pro-DP 
newspaper was quite silent. Zafer informed its readers about the Soviet occupation 
in its inner pages. The first headline on Zafer about the Hungarian Revolt was 
seen on November 5 after the second invasion of Budapest by the Soviet tanks.295 
Furthermore, foreign policy columnist of Zafer steadily stated that the Hungarian 
“rebels” were about to lose the war.296 None of Zafer’s editorials was related with 
Hungary. 
 It is questionable whether the limited interest of the newspapers (especially 
editors) to the Hungarian Uprising could be another sign for the relaxation of the 
anti-Soviet sentiment in Turkey. Because a harsher reaction could be expected at 
least from the permanent carriers of the anti-Soviet banner, in accordance with the 
severe anti-Soviet stance of the Turkish press since 1945 up to 1955. In 1945, the 
anti-Sovietism was limited with the condemnation of the Soviet aspirations over 
the Straits. However, in 1953, almost entire Turkish press frequently dwelt on a 
variety of topics from the inhuman treatments and persecutions in the Soviet 
Union to the agricultural crises. Individual reaction of Yalman was still prevalent, 
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but the other anti-Soviet editors and foreign policy correspondents, including 
Yalçın, Esmer, Fenik, and Atay showed less interest to a disputable move of the 
USSR. 
 The Hungarian Uprising was the last event, in which the Soviet 
antagonism in the Turkish newspapers rose simultaneously. After 1956, the total 
anti-Sovietism lost its prominence in the press gradually. It could be seen as one 
of the direct results of the revision of Stalinist foreign policy. However, 
Malenkov’s relatively “softer” stance was not enough to eliminate the anxiety of 
the press. The attitude of the Turkish press was also indirectly related to the 
governmental direction in the foreign policy. The Menderes government still 
seemed confident about the American support. Although the former foes of 
Moscow, primarily Tito’s Yugoslavia, seriously appraised the Soviet moves to 
revitalization of the relations, Turkey was still reluctant to respond Moscow’s call 
for the rehabilitation of Turco-Soviet partnership.  
There were two differences between the periods 1944-1953 and 1953-
1956. At first, state control over the press was much less rigid than it had been in 
1945. During 1950s Turkish newspapers were free to narrate news from the 
foreign agencies and choose their place between the government and the 
opposition. On the other hand, this freedom was existent, if and only if 
government did not face a fiery opposition, as RPP had been previously 
challenged by Tan in 1945. The situation would change during late 1950s. 
Moreover, the attention of the press would be repelled, after the tension in 
domestic politics rose, triggering an increased governmental oppression over 
several Turkish newspapers, including former supporters of Menderes, such as 
Ahmet Emin Yalman. 
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CHAPTER V 
 
 
THE OVERHADOWED SOVIETOPHOBIA DURING 
THE TURBULENT YEARS OF TURKEY (1957–1960)  
 
 
 
5.1. On the eve of the Syrian Crisis (January – August 1957): 
  
 The extent of anti-Soviet content in the Turkish press continuously 
diminished after the suppression of the Hungarian Uprising, but it was still 
present. In fact, the foreign relations were not neglected in the press until the 
parliamentary election of 1957, but the anxiety caused by the Soviet threat 
remained under the shadow of the Cyprus Question, which had already become 
the most pressing concern in the Turkish press. Still, Turkish correspondents were 
eager to associate the Soviet antagonism with the Greek Cypriots, claiming the 
existence of an “immense support” of Moscow for the Greek Cypriots.297 
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 General perspective of the Turkish press about the Soviet Union was not 
much different than the period of 1953 – 1956. Many Turkish correspondents 
were still incredulous about the Soviet moves. After a semi-official speech of 
Khrushchev in the New Year’s Eve, in which he praised Stalin, several Turkish 
newspapers claimed that the Soviet Union would return to Stalinism.298 
 This could be regarded as a direct result of the ruthless reaction of 
Khrushchev government during the Hungarian Uprising, which had contributed to 
the mistrust of the Turkish public opinion. It was still possible to see Hungary in 
the headlines of Turkish newspapers, but now the calm rhetoric of the press 
showed that many journalists were convinced that the hopes for Hungary were 
over.299 As a result, the new Soviet attempts for a rapprocehement under the 
auspices of the new Soviet foreign minister, Dmitriy Trofimovich Shepilov were 
interpreted with suspicion among the Turkish correspondents.300  
The fear of the Soviet Russia was not intense as it had been in 1953, but 
the press still continued its warnings about a possible Russian agression. After the 
replacement of Soviet foreign minister Shepilov with Andrey Andreyevich 
Gromyko, who would hold the post for 28 years, several newspapers published 
speculative comments about the new minister, regarding him as the new executor 
of Stalin’s foreign policy. As a matter of fact, it seemed to become a usual 
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reaction in the Turkish press.301 On the other hand, the comments about the 
American – Soviet conflict indicated that the Turkish press still trusted the 
American support, especially after the declaration of the Eisenhower Doctrine. 
Yalman, as usual, praised the Eisenhower Doctrine as the “savior of the Middle 
East.”302  
It was somewhat difficult to interpret the simultaneous existence of the 
confidence of press for the American support to Turkey and their anxieties 
towards the Soviet Union. The Turkish journalists apparently kept their disbelief 
for the ongoing “de-Stalinization” in the Soviet Union, as they were still 
interested on the frequent intrigues in the Soviet leadership.303 In addition, it was 
still possible to observe speculative news and routine Soviet criticism about the 
Western culture. 304 
This relative relaxation could be even visible in the most severe anti-
Soviet figures in the Turkish press. The rhetoric of Hüseyin Cahit Yalçın in his 
last articles was quite calm in comparison to the past.305 The last anti-Soviet 
article of the veteran journalist before his death on October 18, 1957, was a self-
criticism for Turkey, in which he stated his disappointment about the 
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backwardness of Istanbul in comparison to Moscow in terms of the municipality 
services.306  
It was also meaningful to observe that the relaxation of anti-Sovietism was 
accelerated after the serious offers of the Soviet government, concerning financial 
aid, and investment in Turkey, following the appointment of a new ambassador to 
Ankara, Nikita Semionovich Ryzhov.307 The majority of the Turkish newspapers 
had positive headlines about the Soviet Union. 
 
 
5.2. “The Summer Madness” (September – December 1957): 
 
The improvement in the trade relations between the Soviet Union and 
Turkey halted after a sudden crisis in Turco-Soviet relations. The prevalent 
hostility between Turkey and its Soviet-sponsored neighbor Syria caused a new 
tension between the Menderes government and the Soviet leadership. The minor 
crises between Turkey and the USSR could be considered as normal with regard 
to the hostility since 1945, but this time the tension might be assessed as a 
surprising incident, as the relation between Turkey and the Soviet Russia had 
begun to improve. Therefore, the real reasons behind the Syrian Crisis of 1957 
(i.e. “The Summer Madness”) could be related with the internal politics both in 
Turkey and in the Soviet Union.  
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The Democratic Party of Menderes and the Republican People’s Party of 
İnönü, along with two new minor oppositionary parties,308 had a fierce 
competition before the parliamentary elections in 1957. Both sides were ready to 
utilize any means of propaganda against the other, certainly including the mutual 
allegations for pro-Sovietism. For instance, both İnönü and Bayar had accused 
each other of seeking alliance with the Soviet Union during the heyday of the 
Straits Crisis of 1945. 309 A direct threat from the Soviet Union on the eve of the 
elections could confuse the minds of the voters. 
In fact, the tension between Syria and Turkey was not new. Following the 
increased Soviet attention towards the Middle East, the Turkish press had already 
begun to criticize Syria after 1955 to open its lands to the Soviet imperialism.310 
The crisis emerged after the formation of a radical leftist government in 
Syria, which increased the suspicions of the West about a possible Soviet intrigue 
over the Syrian regime. In fact, Turkey did not have greater aspirations over Syria 
than Iraq, Jordan, or the Western governments had. However, when a secret 
summit was held in Ankara between Menderes, Miner (American Ambassador to 
Ankara), and the Iraqi crown prince Abd al-Ilah, the Turkish Prime Minister 
seemed the most enthusiast one for the intervention to Syria.311 According to the 
reports of the American diplomats, the Menderes government aimed to declare 
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war upon Syria after concentrating their troops on the south, even after Iraqi 
Prime Minister Nuri al-Said objected the Turkish intervention, though he desired 
an active move to Syria.312 
As usual, the Turkish press was not informed about the Turkish plans. 
Therefore, several newspapers, especially the pro-DP journalists, had an angry 
reaction since the first Soviet warning, and they made several references to the 
speeches of Menderes, in which he denied the Soviet allegations.313 Only Zafer 
did not publish the Soviet accusations. In fact, the press did not emphasize much 
on the issue, except for Yalman, who furiously attacked Russians and warned the 
public opinion, claiming that Russians had settled on the Mediterranean with its 
military bases in Syria.314 The other newspapers did not depict the situation as a 
near threat.  
On the other front, it was also doubtful that the Soviet Union could dare to 
attack Turkey or any other country for the sake of Syria. The “Summer Madness” 
also referred to the same period with the climax of the political struggle between 
Khrushchev and Zhukov.  
Nikita Sergeyevich Khrushchev was de facto the most powerful man in the 
Soviet leadership, though he had not consolidated his power as the supreme 
authority in the Politburo, yet.315 As it had been mentioned, Khrushchev had 
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accused Malenkov of fearing from the West. In 1957, another struggle between 
Khrushchev and Georgiy Konstantinovich Zhukov, the popular commander of the 
Red Army, arose. A possible reason for Khrushchev to foment an international 
crisis could be his aim to gain power and reputation against Zhukov.316 As a 
matter of fact, Khrushchev tactically denied the existence of a crisis, when he 
appeared in the Turkish embassy in Moscow for the 34th anniversary of the 
Turkish Republic, on October 29, 1957. However, Khrushchev’s speech did not 
appear in Turkish newspapers, except for Dünya.317 This also indicated the 
disinterest of the press against the Soviet threat, in contrast to their perspective in 
the previous years. Either the confidence of the Turkish press about American 
support or simply their lack of information prevented the emergence of a new 
anti-Soviet period in the press. Especially Zafer’s silence was a key point to 
understand the intentions of the government. After the “Summer Madness” 
Turkey and the Soviet Union did not have a serious confrontation until the Cuban 
Missile Crisis. On the other hand, the attention of the press shifted to domestic 
matters until the fall of Menderes. 
 
 
5.3. From Sputnik to the End of the DP: (January 1958 – May 1960) 
 
“The Summer Madness” overshadowed the worldwide remarkable success 
of the Sputnik I on October 4, 1957. Although the general interest of press on the 
Soviet Union diminished due to the news concerning 1957 elections, the political 
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struggle in the Soviet leadership still found place in the newspapers, but not on the 
headlines. For instance, Zhukov’s fall was informed to Turkish readers by Ulus 
and Cumhuriyet newspapers in their inner pages.318 
No article was published in the political newspapers to inform the launch 
of Sputnik I. Only Hürriyet published the news in an inner page article two days 
after the launch.319 In a sense, it might be claimed that the Turkish journalists did 
not take it seriously, when they received the news from the foreign agencies. 
However, the newspapers began to publish news about the Sputnik II with a 
limited interest. Some newspapers, such as Cumhuriyet, Milliyet, and Ulus used a 
calm language,320 while Vatan had an unfriendly hostile rhetoric.321 Anyway, the 
Sputnik Program was not reflected as a sensational progress initially by the 
Turkish press. Once, an article appeared in Zafer with a title related to Sputnik, 
but it was only an ironic criticism about RPP, which were usually seen in Zafer.322 
Instead, there were still false speculations. Akşam claimed that Russians had 
established a radar network in the Armenian SSR, which was able to divert the 
Turkish airplanes to the Soviet lands.323 (This is even impossible with the 
contemporary technology of the 21th century). 
After the recognition of the temporary Soviet supremacy in the space race, 
the newspapers began to evaluate the news about the Soviet Union with a 
relatively respectful language. It was even possible to observe appreciations or 
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praises.324 However, this did not refer to the end of speculative news and hostile 
comments about the Soviet progress in the space race.325 
In 1958, there was a temporary increase in anti-Soviet articles. However, 
none of the newspapers published serial editorials concerning the “Soviet threat.” 
After the death of Hüseyin Cahit Yalçın on October 18, 1957, another veteran 
author, Yakup Kadri Karaosmanoğlu began to write editorials for Ulus, but his 
perspective was not as harsh as Yalçın’s and he rarely assessed the Turco-Soviet 
relations. On the other hand there were speculations about a possible Soviet 
attack, in reference to the rumors about the Soviet military maneuvers in 
Transcaucasia.326 
In fact, a sudden rise of anti-Soviet articles was observed mostly in Akşam, 
which did not occupy a primary place in the anti-Soviet press bloc in early 1950s. 
However, the newspaper was still interested to publish the news about the Soviet 
Union with a suspicious language. As a typical example, Akşam interviewed the 
players of the Galatasaray SK to ask questions about the daily life in the Soviet 
Union, following their return from Russia, after they vanquished Zenit Leningrad 
on July 8, 1957.327   
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The press discussed the fall of Bulganin with anxiety. The reactions were 
not as anxious as the previous times, such as the death of Stalin and the resign of 
Malenkov. In general, Turkish newspapers informed their readers about the 
Khrushchev’s rise to power and his characteristics with a moderate rhetoric.328 
Only Vatan and Dünya maintained their previous suspicions, naming Khrushchev 
as the “Second Stalin,” as they also did during the first days of Malenkov and 
Bulganin.329 Yalman, who had been currently assessing the Sputnik in his 
editorials as a serious warning for the West, found a brand new issue to discuss.330 
Yalman was parallel with the routine anti-Soviet stance of the RPP front. Ahmet 
Şükrü Esmer and Yavuz Abadan (1905-1967), who wrote editorials for Ulus for a 
short time before Karaosmanoğlu, also continued the Soviet antagonism in the 
RPP newspaper. However, neither Ulus nor Dünya was much severe as before.331 
Moreover, the improvement in the relations in 1959 would temporarily change 
Esmer’s negative perspective. On November 9, 1959, the veteran journalist 
celebrated the 42th anniversary of the October Revolution in his column and 
expressed his optimist belief for Khrushchev’s efforts “to repair Stalin’s 
mistakes.”332  
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The only exception for the relaxation was Yalman, who never left pro-
American stance. As it had been mentioned, up the end of 1950s, Yalman’s 
relation with the governmental circles soured. It was possible to see pejorative 
cartoons on Zafer, depicting Yalman mostly as “a producer of lie and an ardent 
supporter of the American mandate.”333 In order to improve his relations with 
Menderes, Yalman published open letters to the Prime Minister, reminding their 
common aim with him to struggle against communism.334 As a matter of fact, 
Yalman never stopped its antagonism towards Moscow335 until he was unjustly 
arrested due to his criticism of the government. After his release, Yalman 
concentrated on the domestic politics and future of the regime after the fall of 
Menderes. On the other hand, even Vatan’s attitude was not as harsh as before. 
On May 27, 1959, the newspaper published the travel notes of author Âgâh Sırrı 
Levent, who visited Moscow as a guest of the Institute of Oriental Studies of the 
Russian Academy of Sciences. Levent’s account depicted Moscow as “one of the 
most beautiful capitals of Europe.”336 
The tendency to relate any kind of anti-Americanism with the Soviet 
intelligence continued until 1960s, but to a decreased extent. After the coup d’etat 
of General Abd-el Kerim Qasim in Iraq, the word “communist” was not referred 
to him in the press. In addition, only Nadir Nadi alleged the involvement of the 
Soviet Union in the events in Iraq.337 
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From 1958 until mid-1959, Akşam surprisingly seemed the only newspaper 
in the Turkish press, which increased its voice in terms of anti-Sovietism. This 
newspaper emphasized both the government’s struggle against the government on 
one hand, and insisted on the prevalence of the Soviet threat on the other hand. 
However, the anti-Soviet news and articles were not frequent as before, except for 
a feuilleton about the Communist China.338 In addition, Akşam did not employ a 
harsh anti-Soviet figure in the press equal to Yalman or Yalçın’s level. Once, 
Hıfzı Topuz (1923 - ) a young journalist from Akşam wrote two exceptional 
articles about the Soviet threat but did not continue.339 The attitude of Akşam also 
relaxed up to 1960. 
The press also did not launch a new wave of anti-Sovietism in these years, 
in spite of the emergence of negative incidents, such as the shooting of a few 
Turkish villagers by the Soviet border troops on August 21, 1959.340 The issue 
was neglected after a short time. Instead, some newspapers, especially 
Cumhuriyet, concentrated on the mutual diplomatic visits between the USA and 
the USSR in contrast to another group of newspapers, which neglected the Cold 
War affairs, while foreign issues were extensively dwelled on domestic politics 
                                               
338
 “Gizli Komünistlerle Mücadele Programı Hazırlandı: Tatbikatla Milli Eğitim, Milli Savunma 
ve İçişleri Bakanlıkları Meşgul Olacak” Akşam, 5 January 1958; “Komünist Sızmalarına Karşı 
Müessir Tedbirler Alınıyor: Pasaport ve Vize Kontrolları da Daha Büyük Titizlikle Yapılacak” 
Akşam, 23 March 1958; “Fransa’daki İşçiler Bile Komünizmden Yüz Çevirdi” Akşam, 7 October 
1958; Ergun Birol, “Ruslara Atılan Şamar: Batı Berlin Seçimleri” Akşam, 14 December 1958; 
“Kruşçef, Komünizmin En Büyük Şarlatanıdır [from the speech of Paul-Henri Spaak, secretary-
general of NATO]” Akşam, 22 February 1959; “Komünist Ajanları Din Âlimi Kisvesine Giriyor 
[from the speech of Şemsettin Günaltay, former Turkish Prime Minister]” Akşam, 13 April 1959; 
“Komünist Tehlikesi Gittikçe Yayılıyor” Akşam, 22 June 1959; “Karadenizdeki Rus Filosu Büyük 
Tehlike Teşkil Ediyor” Akşam, 12 July 1959; Joachim Heidt, “Kızıl Çin – Dünyayı Bekleyen 
Büyük Tehlike” Akşam, 4 April - 8 May 1959. 
339
 Hıfzı Topuz, “Sovyet Tehdidi” Akşam, 16 September 1957; idem, “Antikomünist beyanname” 
Akşam, 28 September 1957. 
340
 “Türk - Rus Hududunda Bir Tecavüz Hâdisesi: Sovyet Askerleri, Çayır Biçmekte Olan 4 
Vatandaşımızı Ateş Yağmuruna Tuttular” Cumhuriyet, 22 August 1959; “Rus Sınır Nöbetçileri 
Dört Vatandaşimıza Ateş Ettiler” Dünya, 22 August 1959. 
 94
during the increased tension between the government and the opposition.341 
Moreover, several newspapers began to be closed temporarily by the government 
after 1958. It was forbidden to publish news, which mentions the oppressions of 
the government over the opposition.342 
During the peak of the domestic political tension in Turkey, foreign affairs 
of Turkey lost its prominence temporarily. During the official visit of Menderes to 
the United States, Zafer published the full text of all speeches of the Prime 
Minister. However, the government’s newspaper never highlighted the positive or 
negative comments from him. For instance, Vatan emphasized Menderes’ 
criticism over the “pretensious behavior of Russia” in their “peace-loving” stance, 
in his speech in Dallas, while Zafer did not mention the part about Russia in its 
headlines.343 Similarly, Zafer was silent about the official visit of a Turkish 
delegation to Moscow led by Lütfü Kırdar, Turkish Minister of Health, while 
Cumhuriyet notified the public about the event.344 On March 1960, Akşam 
informed its readers about a suspicious shipwreck of a Soviet freighter on the 
shores of Dardanelles, but none of the other newspapers assessed this incident.345     
The relations between the Soviet Union and Turkey continued to improve, 
when Menderes was officially invited by Khrushchev. As a result, the atmosphere 
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drastically changed. All newspapers, including Ulus, published optimistic articles 
about the Soviet Union, reminding of the cordial relations in Atatürk’s time.346 
This time, Falih Rıfkı Atay was alone in keeping his misgivings. According to 
him, “the difference between Stalin, who never left the USSR, and Khrushchev, 
who travelled thousands of kilometers could only be explained in terms of 
pragmatism.347 
The last Cold War tension before the end of the Menderes government was 
the U-2 Incident. Under normal circumstances, this vital moment of the Cold War 
would be published in press. In a sense, this was a problem, which was also 
related with Turkey, as it was claimed that the pilot Gary Powers took off from 
Turkey.348 However, there was only a limited reaction after the incident for two 
reasons. At first, the political turmoil in the country overshadowed the U-2 crisis. 
Secondly, lots of newspapers, including Cumhuriyet, Dünya, and Ulus were 
closed in early May, 1960, due to publishing the student demonstrations against 
Menderes on April 28, 1960. Nevertheless, it was possible to observe limited but 
careful observation on the course of events related to U-2 Crisis.349    
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5.4. “Coup d’Etat of May 27” and Its Aftermath (May – December 1960): 
 
The Coup of May 27 did not divert Turkey from its way on pro-Western 
foreign policy. On the other hand, Menderes’ fall could be regarded as an excuse 
for the deterioration of Turco-Soviet relations (similar to Khrushchev’s tactic to 
accuse Stalin for Turkey’s defection into the Western camp), although the anti-
Soviet policy predated his leadership. Now the former Prime Minister could be 
blamed either for confronting the Soviet Union or making plans for alliance with 
Khrushchev. 350 
 
 Until September 1, the relations with the Soviet Union were rarely 
discussed in the press, although there were news about the U-2 Crisis and some 
minor skirmishes on the Turco–Soviet border.351 The mutual diplomatic visits 
between the countries were cancelled as a natural result of the coup in Turkey.352 
Between June 28 and July 8, 1960, Khrushchev and the new Turkish 
Premier, Cemal Gürsel, exchanged letters.353 This correspondence did not cause a 
drastic change in the course of the relations. However, the press was not informed 
until September 1. The Turkish press was still backward from the events, but did 
not omit the event. In general, the press evaluated the correspondence as a sign of 
confidence of the Soviet Union for the new regime in Turkey.354     
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During the efforts for the resettlement of the democratic regime in Turkey, 
the relations with the Soviet Union lost its prominence in the press, as a 
continuation of the period from 1956 to 1960.355 It could be claimed that there 
were three main reasons for the relaxation of the anti-Soviet sentiment in the 
Turkish press. First, during the last four years of the Menderes government, the 
Cyprus Question became the most essential foreign policy question in the Turkish 
foreign policy. Second reason was the severe clash between RPP and DP resulted 
with the coup. Third reason could be the death and retirement of old journalists 
(such as Abidin Dâver, Necmettin Sadık Sadak, Şükrü Kaya, and certainly 
Hüseyin Cahit Yalçın). 
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CHAPTER VI 
 
 
THE DIMINISHED ANTAGONISM TOWARDS THE 
USSR: FROM GAGARIN TO KHRUSHCHEV’S FALL 
(1961 – 1964)  
 
 
 
6.1. Popularity of “The New Left” Perspective in the Turkish Press: 
 
There were several direct reasons for the continuation of the reduction in 
the Soviet antagonism in press, such as the intense domestic political agenda, 
including the trials of the former DP members, preparation and ratification of a 
new constitution and the elections. Consequently, the pro-DP front in the Turkish 
press, many of which followed the anti-Soviet stance of the government, was 
oppressed. Zafer was closed and could not be published until late 1962. 
An indirect reason for the gradual weakening of anti-Sovietism between 
1961 and 1964 could be the rise of the left ideology in Turkey. The most essential 
aspect of the Turkish press after 1961 was the drastic changes in the perspectives 
of some newspapers. The democratization period after the Coup of May 27 
 99
opened way to the flourishment of the new ideologic streams in Turkey, 
especially in terms of the establishment of a democratic leftist faction. The 
supporters of this new stream, which was predominantly under the influence of 
the Western socialism, held a strong place in the Turkish press. Ironically, Vatan 
became their first press organ. 
The transformation in Vatan was a turning point in terms of the relaxation 
of the anti-Sovietism, as the change also referred to Yalman’s resign. A conflict 
between Ahmet Emin Yalman and other shareholders of Vatan resulted with the 
leave of Yalman in early 1961. One year later, Şevket Süreyya Aydemir began to 
write the editorials of Vatan. After Aydemir, several prominent leftist figures, 
including Behice Boran, Çetin Altan, Oktay Akbal, and Doğan Avcıoğlu (1926-
1983), the founder of the nationalist-leftist Yön journal, joined Vatan. The leftist 
stance of Vatan did last long, but played an influential role until 1963. The new 
left was also implicitly supported by Akşam, Milliyet, and Cumhuriyet.356  
After leaving Vatan, Yalman initially wrote some articles for Dünya as a 
guest author. Later he opened Yeni Vatan but it became a great disappointment for 
the veteran journalist. After this failure, Yalman sometimes sent articles to 
newspapers, but did not work in the permanent staff of a newspaper. With the 
leave of Yalman, the second strongest figure of the anti-Soviet sentiment in 1950s 
resigned from the press.  
Consequently, lots of articles and even editorials, which assessed the 
socialism and its differences from communism, were appeared in the 
newspapers.357 Surprisingly, it was also possible to see anti-communist accounts 
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in the same newspapers, which concurrently praised socialism.358 Indeed, the 
leftist journalists did not launch an explicit propaganda in favor of pro-Soviet 
foreign policy. However, their relatively neutral stance between the USA and the 
USSR estranged them from pro-Americanism, which simultaneously referred to 
anti-Sovietism. Moreover, the rise of the ‘new left’ would motivate the RPP 
politicians to adopt the identity of the “left of the centre,”359 although the 
journalists of Ulus, especially Ahmet Şükrü Esmer maintained his anti-Soviet 
tendencies for a while.          
 
 
6.2. Hailing “the Space Conquerors” (January 1961 – September 1962): 
 
 Although the Turkish press neglected the Soviet success in the space race 
after the launching of Sputnik I, the following steps of the USSR, especially after 
the return of the Soviet cosmonauts Yuriy Alekseyevich Gagarin and Valentina 
Vladimirovna Tereshkova, respectively as the first man and woman in the space. 
Unlike in 1957, the new successes of the USSR did not arouse negative comments 
or criticisms in the Turkish press. 
 After Gagarin’s voyage, the headlines of some newspapers denoted that 
many journalists were astonished by the Soviet success and no more eager to 
publish suspicisions about the Soviet progress.360 On the other hand, misgivings 
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were still prevalent to a small extent. For instance, Nadir Nadi warned the public 
about “the possible Russian manipulation of Gagarin’s victory as a tool for 
propaganda, after appreciating the success of the northern neighbor of Turkey.”361 
On the other hand, this positive moment did not mean an entire turn. The same 
newspapers supported the USA one week later, during the American-sponsored 
Bay of Pigs Invasion, and Berlin Crisis on August 1961, although the latter was 
overshadowed by the declaration of Menderes’ sentence of death.362  
 The space race was assessed generally out of the ongoing discussions of 
the Cold War in the Turkish press. The new successes were generally regarded as 
positive steps for humanity without separating the moves of two superpowers.363 
Another aspect of this period was the association of the classic anti-Soviet 
sentiment with the sympathy for the new regime. The most eminent examples 
were Falih Rıfkı Atay’s editorials in Dünya. Atay did not join his colleagues 
celebrating Gagarin. Instead, he condemned the Soviet Union due to the co-
existence of the space conqueror and the poverty in the same country.364 In the 
following days, Atay praised the Turkish Army to defend the country from 
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communism.365 In a sense, there was no radical difference in Atay’s ideas, at least 
in terms of his enmity towards the Soviet Union. In 1962, he even implied the 
possibility of a “collaboration of the Justice Party (JP) and the New Turkey Party 
(NTP)366  with the Soviet Union,” similar to his old days, in which he attributed 
the pro-Soviet label to any kind of opposition to his ideas.367 At the same time, his 
colleague A. İhsan Barlas used a very polite language for Khrushchev, in contrast 
to his old times.368 The classic anti-Soviet news and articles were mostly 
published by Ulus (especially Ahmet Şükrü Esmer with his frequent Soviet 
criticism), and were contributed by Akşam.369 
 The anti-Soviet content also decreased in 1962, in spite of the continuous 
misgivings of Ulus journalists, who insisted on the “warlike” characteristics of 
Khrushchev as the successor of Stalin.370 On the other hand, this time the USA 
was also criticized in the press first time. Şevket Süreyya Aydemir questioned the 
characteristics of the same country, “which showed its most generous side to 
Turkey, but was also responsible for the incredible massacres in the South 
Vietnam.”371 Nevertheless it was still early to mention a balance in the Turkish 
press between the pro-American and anti-American sides. 
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6.3. Strange Tranquility During the Cuban Missile Crisis (October 1962): 
 
The Cuban Missile Crisis was not only a turning point in the Cold War, 
but also the most serious threat Turkey faced since 1940s. However, the attitude 
of the Turkish newspapers was controversial in terms of reflecting the real extent 
of the threat, as if Turkey was out of the crisis. The only possible reason for the 
limited interest of the Turkish press during the Cuban Missile Crisis could be the 
lack of knowledge in Turkish public opinion about the Jupiter Missiles, for which 
Turkey could have been embroiled to a possible Third World War. 
The Jupiter Missiles were installed on Turkey in 1959.372 The public was 
not notified with this step of the Menderes government. It was only once implied 
in an article of Vatan, which made reference to the Dallas speech of Menderes in 
1959.373 
The presence of the missiles was a matter of debate since the first day of 
the crisis. For instance, Akşam’s headline on October 24, 1962, states that the 
crisis was serious enough to drag the world into a nuclear war. The newspaper did 
not deny the existence of the missiles but depicted them with an exaggerated 
range of 2400 kilometres.374 Akşam was the only newspaper, which warned that 
Turkey could be pulled into the crisis and three days later declared undesired 
entrance of Turkey to the course of events.375 In fact, there was a noteworthy 
confusion among the different newspapers. Akşam and Vatan had explicit 
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publication, which never denied the existence of the missiles. Vatan’s editor 
Aydemir expressed his fear for both sides in a possible war, while Doğan 
Avcıoğlu complained about the missile bases, which could not protect peace, but 
easily pose threat to peace.376 
A second group of newspapers, including Hürriyet, did not deny the 
existence of the missiles in their headlines but also avoided attaching their 
personel comments about the presence of the Jupiters in Turkey.377  
The third group completely denied the claims about the missiles. In this 
group, the pro-RPP newspapers, Dünya and Ulus existed alongside with Zafer, 
which was newly re-established and joined into press as the supporter of JP. 
Interestingly, Bedii Faik Akın did not attack the Soviet Union, instead expressed 
his fury about Fidel Castro. According to Akın, “Castro was unjust to allow the 
installation of offensive bases in his country, which were incomparable with the 
defensive NATO bases in Turkey,” 378 ignoring the Bay of Pigs Invasion, two 
years ago. In addition, Fürûzan Tekil, the new editor of Zafer, adopted the 
perspective of Akın.”379 Dünya regarded the claims of Khrushchev merely as false 
allegations.380 
After the crisis was over, John F. Kennedy accepted the deployment of the 
missiles, which had been previously considered as a threat in the hands of Turkey 
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by the Americans.381 Many accounts on the Cold War agree on the Kennedy’s 
trade of the Jupiters in Turkey in exchange for the missiles in Cuba.382 However, 
the Turkish press was not cognizant about the negotiatons between the 
superpowers. The press was still discussing the speculations concerning the 
American aid, after Hürriyet claimed that “the US government could stop 
financial aid, after they detected two Turkish ships carrying Russian grain to 
Cuba.383” In addition, Akşam was the only newspaper in the Turkish press, which 
informed its readers about the deployment of the Jupiter missiles from Turkey 
without reference to the US government. According to the news in Akşam, “the 
missiles were deployed because of remaining obsolete and their places were 
detected by the Russians.”384 
The incoherence of the news, published in the Turkish press during the 
Cuban Missile Crisis once more showed the insufficieny of the resources of the 
press. In addition, the foreign policy content of the newspapers was lower than it 
was before. Furthermore, the newspapers emphasized neither Soviet imperialism 
nor American behavior, which jeopardized the security of Turkey, during the 
following days. 
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6.4. Until the Ouster of Khrushchev (December 1962 – December 1964): 
 
The Turkish correspondents were somewhat jolted after the American 
decision for the deployment of the Jupiters, but the reaction was still limited. Four 
months after the Cuban Missile Crisis, the famous journalist Metin Toker (1924-
2002), who was the son-in-law of İsmet İnönü, complained about the removal of 
the missiles, stating that “the West should consider the security of Turkey as a 
priority for the security of the West.”385 However, the Soviet Union seemed out of 
the agenda during 1963. As a noteworthy detail, none of the Turkish newspapers 
but Cumhuriyet386 informed the public about the establishment of Moscow – 
Washington Hotline (a.k.a. The Red Telephone), which played a critical role after 
the Cuban Missile Crisis as an initial sign of rapprochement between the 
superpowers. Another neglected event was the death of the most famous Turkish 
dissident, Nâzım Hikmet Ran, in the Soviet Union on June 3, 1963. None of the 
Turkish newspapers assessed the death of the famous poet, although they had 
published lots of speculative news about him in the past.387  
 From the end of the Cuban Missile Crisis until the rise of ethnic conflict in 
Cyprus on December 1963, the tension between Turkey and the Soviet Union was 
low. On the other hand, the press reflected the ongoing intolerant attitude of the 
junta regime towards the communists in Turkey.388 The simultaneous 
improvement of the relations between the Soviet Union and the maintenance of 
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the state oppression over communists signaled the return of the Janus-headed 
policy. 
 The Turkish journalists also began to evaluate the Sino–Soviet Split, 
especially after the expansions and wars in China. Following the Sino-Indian War 
of 1962, the attention of the Turkish correspondents was shifted to China. Apart 
from hostile articles about the “cruel” treatment of Chinese over the Uyghur Turks 
or other ethnic groups, objective assessments were also visible, such as the 
editorial of Şevket Süreyya Aydemir, who pointed out the nationalist tendencies 
in the communist world, as the primary reason for the split.389  
In spite of the relative stability in the relations with Moscow, it was still 
possible to see agitated news and articles about the Soviet Union. On the other 
hand, the majority of the news of this period was mostly related to the Soviet 
oppression over its satellites. For instance, it was quite popular to publish either 
jolly or tragic stories about the East German refugees, who tried to pass the Berlin 
Wall.390 Although the number of the news related to the daily life in the Soviet 
Union was drastically decreased, and the praises for the reforms in the Soviet 
Union, such as the abolition of censorship over the foreign correspondents in 
Moscow.391  
 Another remarkable step for the Turkish press in early 1960 was the 
emergence of different views related with the Turkish foreign policy among the 
journalists. In contrast to the period from 1945 to 1960, the newspapers began to 
criticize the foreign policy directions of the government. As a typical example, 
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 Orhan Karaveli, “Moskova Sansürü Kaldırdı” Vatan, 31 March 1961; M. Piri, “Sovyet 
Rusya’da Sansür Kalktı” Cumhuriyet, 6 April 1961. 
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Zafer criticized the foreign policy of RPP, which aimed to improve the relations 
with the Soviet Union in order to achieve the support of Moscow in the Cyprus 
Question.392 This also enabled the transfer of discussions related with the foreign 
aid to the newspapers. During 1950s, the USA seemed the best alternative for 
financial aid. However, the American aid gradually decreased.393 After 1960, the 
suspicions about the end of the American aid were reflected to the press.394 
Therefore, the government had to evaluate the new alternatives. Beginning from 
1959, the Soviet offers for the financial aid were discussed in the Turkish 
newspapers.395 Previously, Turkish journalists interpreted financial offers of the 
Soviet Union as the part of a strategy and this perspective was still visible in 
1961.396 This also contributed to the improvement of the Soviet image in the 
Turkish press. Improvement in the trade relations positively updated the view of 
journalists for the Soviet Union. 
 The improvement in the Turco-Soviet relations also prevented the 
emergence of the crises similar to 1950s. The tensest moment with the Soviet 
Union until the fall of Khrushchev was on early 1964. After the rise of ethnic 
clashes on Cyprus, the Turkish press began to foment the public opinion to 
legitimize that the intervention of Turkey as a guarantor until mid-1964. First, the 
press alleged the Soviet Union sold weapons to Greek Cypriots,397 following a 
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verbal note of the Soviet Union.398 In fact, the problem between the Soviet Union 
and Turkey was resolved after the visit of the Turkish Foreign Minister Feridun 
Cemal Erkin to Moscow at the end of the year. The majority of the press 
supported the rapprochement with the USSR; even the oppositional Zafer did not 
assess the visit with negative criticism.399 
 The last apparent example of the relaxation of the negative Soviet image 
was the calm reaction after the fall of Khrushchev. As it has been mentioned, the 
Turkish press had strong anxieties about after the replacemenets in the Soviet 
leadership. On the other hand, Khrushchev’s fall did not cause an agitated 
athmosphere as before. The majority of the newspapers published the ouster of the 
Soviet Premier only one day, while none of them considered his successors 
(Kosygin or Brejnev) as the “new Stalins.”400 In fact, some journalists were still 
ready to believe the speculations fabricated in the West. For instance, Falih Rıfkı 
Atay claimed that Khrushchev could be overthrown due to his hostile policy 
against China.401 However, the anxieties vanished after Erkin’s visit to Moscow 
on November, 1964.402  
 In fact, the Turkish press was still not informed about the infamous letter 
of the US President Lyndon Johnson to İnönü, in which he warned Turkey not to 
intervene Cyprus.403 The Johnson’s Letter launched a new period in Turkish 
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foreign policy, in which Turkey considered the stable relations with the Soviet 
Union. The rapprochement with the Soviet Union was a regarded golden 
opportunity to balance the USA, as Turkey did not approach Soviet side even after 
the American embargo against Turkey following the Cyprus Crisis of 1974.404  
This would naturally influence the perspectives of the journalists. Up to 
1970s the both supporters of the cordial relations with the Soviet Union and the 
oppositinal figures were existant among the Turkish correspondents. Two articles 
of Atay at the end of 1964 was like the summary of the last four years since May 
27 Coup: Although Atay was still intolerant to the communists in Turkey405 he 
was expressed that his hopes flourished after Erkin’s visit. Atay made reference to 
the cordial relations during Atatürk’s leadership and stated that “to maintain good 
relations with the Soviet Union did not mean to leave the Western alliance.”406  
This perspective signaled the return to the Janus-headed policy, in which 
the Turkish state distinguished the relations with the USSR from its struggle 
against communist movements inside Turkey. Consequently, the closest 
rapprochement between Turkey and the Soviet Union would appear in 1967, 
during the prime ministry of the new JP leader, Süleyman Demirel. The young 
prime minister would allege RPP for the sympathy for communism, after the 
ideological shift of İnönü’s party to the “central left.” Demirel fabricated the 
slogan “Ortanın Solu, Moskova Yolu” (Centre of the left, Road to the Moscow). 
In fact, an article by Falih Rıfkı Atay was like the self-criticism of the prejudicial 
perspective over the Soviet Union in the Turkish press. After the electoral 
victories of the socialist parties in many European countries, he frankly confessed 
the prejudice of Turkish press for the left: 
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…Because we are not among the societies of the Western 
civilization, we live uninformed about the developments in the new 
world. We are obsessed with a [specific] image of communism, 
which we are not able to distinguish from the memories of the first 
days of anarchy during Lenin’s leadership. 407 
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 “Biz Batı medeniyet toplulukları arasında olmadığımız için yeni dünyada neler olup bittiğinden 
habersiz yaşiyoruz. Bir komünistlik tutturmuş gidiyoruz ve bu komünistliği de Lenin devrindeki ilk 
anarşi günlerinin hâtıralarından bir türlü ayıramıyoruz.” See: Falih Rıfkı Atay, “Batı 
Komünistliği Çevresinde” Dünya, 12 November 1964 
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CHAPTER VII 
 
 
CONCLUSION  
 
 
 
The negative Soviet image in the Turkish public between 1945 and 1991 
was a key phenomenon in understanding the political stance of the Turkish leaders 
during the Cold War. Although the emergence of anti-Sovietism in Turkey in 
1945 seemed the natural consequence of the deep rooted anti-Muscovitism in the 
Ottoman Empire, the publications of the state-controlled press in 1945 
demonstrated that Turkish state authorities must have been intentionally fomented 
the antagonism towards the Soviet Union. Without regard to the seriousness of the 
Soviet threat for Turkey in 1945, “anti-Sovietism” must have been used as an 
influential political weapon by the Turkish leaders to call people solidarity for two 
reasons. First, fear of the “Soviet Threat” would motivate people to support pro-
Western foreign policy of the government. Second, both the Republican People’s 
Party and the Democratic Party accused all opposition groups of collaborating 
with the Soviet Union. Incidentally, it was easier for them to mobilize the public 
against these pro-Soviet “traitors.” As it has been mentioned in this study, any 
party could accuse each other of pro-Sovietism and this continued until 1960s. For 
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this reason, the anti-Sovietism was manipulated in several incidents such as the 
closure of the Nation Party in 1953 and Istanbul pogrom in 1955. Therefore, there 
is strong evidence to indicate the governmental role over the rise of anti-Soviet 
sentiment between 1945 and 1953.  
Another important detail is the synonymous consideration of the Soviet 
Union and communism. During Atatürk’s leadership, the Turkish state continued 
its struggle against communists inside Turkey, although the government 
maintained cordial relations with the Soviet Union. However, the deterioration of 
Turco-Soviet relations triggered the amalgamation of anti-Russianism and anti-
communism after 1945. The fury of the Turkish press was not only subjected to 
the Soviet imperialism. The press also attacked all kinds of leftist factions, even 
considering the socialist parties in Europe as the “fifth column” of the Soviet 
Union in their countries. The anti-communist sentiment was later separated from 
the anti-Russian sentiment again. Turkey readopted the Janus-headed policy after 
1964. On one hand, the Turkish state sought better relations with the Soviet Union 
(especially in terms of signing financial treaties). On the other hand, it increased 
the level of oppression over the Turkish communists.  
The anti-Sovietism in the Turkish press between 1945 and 1960 was 
constructed as a mixture of deep rooted anti-Russian legacy and the suspicions 
over the ideology of communism, which was quite unfamiliar for the Turkish 
society. If the correlation between the anti-Russian and anti-communist 
sentiments, it could be easily observed that anti-Russianism dominated the anti-
Soviet image. Two examples in this study indicate the dominance of anti-
Russianism over the anti-communism. First, the press cordially welcomed the 
Yugoslav premier Josip Broz Tito in his official visit to Ankara in 1954. Tito was 
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also a communist, yet a rival for the Soviet Union, therefore considered as a friend 
of Turkey. Second, many journalists made references to the historical imperialist 
aspirations of the Tsarist Russia in their articles. 
 In the process of fomenting anti-Sovietism, the press was the primary 
instrument for the Turkish government. On the other hand, it was not accurate to 
claim that the press was always under the control of the state. In 1945, the 
Republican People’s Party was able to monopolize its control over the press and 
eliminate the dissenters for the government. However, the situation drastically 
changed in 1950s. In 1960, the Menderes government had to deal with a staunch 
bloc of oppositionist newspapers. Moreover, the prominent anti-Soviet 
correspondents, especially Hüseyin Cahit Yalçın and Ahmet Emin Yalman, never 
stopped producing anti-Soviet articles, even after the Menderes government 
decided to respond the Soviet diplomatic moves for the rapprochement with 
Turkey. In a sense, the Turkish press was no more monolithic. The anti-Soviet 
content diminished in the articles by many independent journalists, including 
Nadir Nadi Abalıoğlu and Şükrü Kaya. In addition, the decreased extent of the 
anti-Soviet content in Zafer after 1956 indicated that the anti-Sovietism was no 
more the primary concern of the Menderes government. On the other hand, 
Hüseyin Cahit Yalçın continued to attack the Bolsheviks even during the hardest 
period of his newspaper, when DP accepted the confiscation of all RPP property, 
including Ulus.  
As it had been mentioned in the study, various newspapers in the Turkish 
press were full of anti-Soviet content at the beginning of 1953, while the Soviet 
threat was a routine issue in the editorials. Any typical news related to the Soviet 
politics, such as the “Doctors’ Plot,” could be published on the headlines with 
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large fonts. A decade later, at the end of 1964, the majority of the newspapers did 
not inform even the ouster of Khrushchev on their headlines. Therefore, the 
relaxation of the Soviet antagonism in the Turkish press was obvious, along with 
the diminished interest towards Soviet affairs. As a matter of fact, the relaxation 
of the anti-Sovietism in the Turkish press was not only related to the international 
conjuncture or shifts in the foreign policy of the Turkish government. After the 
leave of some prominent anti-Soviet journalists, the staunch anti-Soviet bloc in 
the Turkish press also weakened. The two notable losses in the anti-Soviet group 
were the death of Yalçın in 1957 and the retirement of Yalman in 1961.  
 
 
The strong anti-Soviet legacy of Cold War Turkey was mostly associated 
with the three-century-old imperialist ambitions of Russia in Turkish 
historiography. However, this study indicates that the Turkish politicians and the 
journalists of 1940s and 1950s were also responsible for the revival of anti-
Russianism, even in a stronger level than it was during Ottoman times. Although 
Soviet antagonism waned both in governmental circles and the press, the 
influence of this second wave of anti-Russianism (which was directly associated 
with anti-communism) was even visible in contemporary political culture of 
Turkey in 21th century. 
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